Firewall / IDS-IPS appliance CRA Risk Assessment Starter
A pre-filled Cyber Resilience Act risk assessment for a next-generation firewall or intrusion detection and prevention appliance inspecting traffic at a network boundary. It covers the Annex III/IV classification and the conformity route that follows from it, a starter asset inventory, a STRIDE threat analysis mapped to Annex I Part I essential cybersecurity requirements, and the likelihood and impact scales those threats are scored against. Treat it as a first draft to challenge and replace with your own product's specifics before it becomes a technical file.
1. Product classification and conformity route
Article 7, Annex III, Annex IV, Article 32Product: [your product name]
Proposed classification: Important, Class II (Annex III, Class II, point 2: Firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems)
Justification: Firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems are listed in Annex III, Class II, point 2. Class II removes the self-assessment route under Article 32, so conformity requires notified-body involvement unless harmonised standards are applied in full.
Conformity route: Article 32(3). Notified-body involvement is required
Standards to apply: IEC 62443-4-1; IEC 62443-4-2; Common Criteria (NDcPP)
Decision owner: [name, role]
Decision date: [date]
Classification drives everything downstream, so settle it before writing the assessment. Check whether any component of your product is separately listed, and record who signed the decision and when. If your product is marketed with a function listed in a higher class, that class wins.
2. Asset inventory
Annex I Part I (1), Article 13(3), Annex VII| Asset | Type | Classification | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appliance firmware | component | internal | Hardened OS image, inspection engine and secure boot chain. |
| Traffic inspection engine | function | restricted | Policy evaluation, deep packet inspection and TLS interception paths. |
| Security policy ruleset | data | restricted | The rule base that defines what is permitted across the boundary. |
| TLS interception keys | data | restricted | Private keys and CA material used for inspection. |
| Management interface | network | restricted | Out-of-band and in-band administration access. |
| Threat signature feed | network | confidential | Vendor channel delivering detection signature updates. |
| Security event log | data | confidential | Alerts and dropped-traffic records used for incident response. |
Assets to add: [anything specific to your architecture, such as third-party services, hardware security modules or region-specific data stores]
An asset is anything an attacker would want to reach, break or abuse. Delete rows that do not exist in your product and add the ones that make yours different, since generic inventories produce generic threats. Classify each asset by the harm its exposure would cause rather than by where it happens to be stored.
3. Threat analysis (STRIDE)
Annex I Part I (2), Article 13(2)| Threat | STRIDE | Asset | L / I | Annex I ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| An attacker exploits known, not fixed vulnerabilities in the product under review. | elevation of privilege | Appliance firmware | high / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(a) |
| An attacker exploits a vulnerability for which a security update is available but not installed. | elevation of privilege | Appliance firmware | high / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(c) |
| An attacker exploits a weakness in the default configuration of the product under review. | elevation of privilege | Appliance firmware | high / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(b) |
| An attacker gains unauthorized access to the product under review. | elevation of privilege | Management interface | high / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(d) |
| An attacker discloses confidential data stored in the product under review. | information disclosure | TLS interception keys | medium / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(e) |
| An attacker tampers stored data in the product under review. | tampering | Security policy ruleset | medium / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(f) |
| An attacker tampers with data transferred to or from the product under review. | tampering | Threat signature feed | medium / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(f), ANNEX I Part I (2)(m) |
| An attacker impacts the availability of basic or essential functions during an incident. | denial of service | Traffic inspection engine | medium / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(h) |
| An attacker tampers with data processed by the product under review and remains undetected. | repudiation | Security event log | medium / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(f) |
| After compromising the product under review, an attacker causes higher-than-necessary impact due to missing or bypassed mitigation mechanisms. | elevation of privilege | Traffic inspection engine | medium / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(k) |
Each threat is tied to an asset and to an Annex I Part I essential requirement, which is what an authority will ask you to evidence. Likelihood and impact here are starting values from the CRA threat catalogue. Re-score them against your own deployment: an interface that is unreachable in your architecture is not a medium risk just because the catalogue says so.
4. Risk criteria
Annex I Part I (1), Article 13(3), Annex VII| Scale | Level | Score | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| likelihood | Rare | 1 | Exceptional occurrence. Highly unlikely during the product lifecycle. |
| likelihood | Unlikely | 2 | Could occur, but only under limited circumstances or with significant effort. |
| likelihood | Possible | 3 | Realistic occurrence under credible attack conditions. |
| likelihood | Likely | 4 | Expected to occur in multiple realistic scenarios or repeated attempts. |
| likelihood | Almost Certain | 5 | Expected to occur frequently or with minimal attacker effort. |
| impact | Negligible | 1 | Minimal operational disruption and no meaningful cybersecurity consequence. |
| impact | Minor | 2 | Limited disruption or localized loss with low recovery effort. |
| impact | Moderate | 3 | Noticeable service disruption, data exposure, or recovery effort requiring management attention. |
| impact | Major | 4 | Severe business disruption, major data compromise, or significant recovery cost. |
| impact | Catastrophic | 5 | Critical operational failure, widespread compromise, safety implications, or major regulatory impact. |
Document the scales before you score anything, otherwise the scoring is unfalsifiable. These are the default five-by-five scales. Adjust the wording so it reflects consequences your organisation actually recognises, and state your risk acceptance threshold explicitly.
5. Risk treatment and mitigations
Annex I Part I (2), Article 13(1)- Appliance firmware: Address known exploitable vulnerabilities before release and maintain an effective vulnerability management process.
- Appliance firmware: Ensure timely deployment of security updates and monitor update compliance.
- Appliance firmware: Harden default settings, minimise enabled services, and require secure initial configuration.
- Management interface: Restrict administration to an out-of-band interface with multi-factor authentication.
- TLS interception keys: Hold interception keys in a hardware security module and never export them in backups.
- Security policy ruleset: Require reviewed, signed policy commits so a silent rule change cannot open the boundary.
- Threat signature feed: Verify signature-feed authenticity before load so a spoofed feed cannot blind detection.
- Traffic inspection engine: Define fail-closed or fail-open behaviour explicitly and keep the device manageable under inspection overload.
- Security event log: Ship events off-box in near real time so log tampering does not erase evidence.
- Traffic inspection engine: Use defence in depth, isolation, least privilege, and exploitation mitigation mechanisms to limit blast radius.
For each risk, record: treatment (accept / mitigate / transfer / avoid), the control that implements it, the residual score after treatment, and the owner.
Accepted risks: [list, with the justification and who accepted them]
A mitigation that is not implemented is not a mitigation. Point each line at a real control, a configuration default or a design decision you can evidence. Accepted risks are legitimate, but they need a named accepter and a reason that survives scrutiny.
6. Vulnerability handling and reporting readiness
Annex I Part II, Article 13(8), Article 14Coordinated vulnerability disclosure contact: [security.txt URL, security contact]
Support period: [end date, per Article 13(8)]
SBOM: [format, where it is maintained]
Article 14 reporting: actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents are reported to ENISA and the CSIRT within 24 hours (early warning) and 72 hours (notification).
Named responsible person: [name, role]
The risk assessment is one half of Annex I. Part II obligations run for the whole support period, so the reporting path has to exist before you place the product on the market, ready ahead of your first exploited vulnerability.
Start this assessment in CVD Portal
Create the product and CVD Portal pre-fills this asset inventory, the matching STRIDE threats and your risk criteria, ready to review and adjust.
Start the assessment