Network management system CRA Risk Assessment Starter
A pre-filled Cyber Resilience Act risk assessment for a centralised controller that discovers, configures and monitors switching, routing and wireless infrastructure. It covers the Annex III/IV classification and the conformity route that follows from it, a starter asset inventory, a STRIDE threat analysis mapped to Annex I Part I essential cybersecurity requirements, and the likelihood and impact scales those threats are scored against. Treat it as a first draft to challenge and replace with your own product's specifics before it becomes a technical file.
1. Product classification and conformity route
Article 7, Annex III, Annex IV, Article 32Product: [your product name]
Proposed classification: Important, Class I (Annex III, Class I, point 6: Network management systems)
Justification: The product is a network management system, listed in Annex III, Class I, point 6. It holds privileged control over managed infrastructure, so compromise propagates across the estate.
Conformity route: Article 32(2). Self-assessment requires applying harmonised standards in full, otherwise a notified-body route applies
Standards to apply: IEC 62443-4-1; IEC 62443-4-2; ISO/IEC 27001
Decision owner: [name, role]
Decision date: [date]
Classification drives everything downstream, so settle it before writing the assessment. Check whether any component of your product is separately listed, and record who signed the decision and when. If your product is marketed with a function listed in a higher class, that class wins.
2. Asset inventory
Annex I Part I (1), Article 13(3), Annex VII| Asset | Type | Classification | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Controller application | component | internal | Server-side application and its bundled runtime dependencies. |
| Device configuration store | data | restricted | Golden configurations and running config backups for managed devices. |
| Managed-device credentials | data | restricted | SSH keys, SNMPv3 and API secrets used to reach managed infrastructure. |
| Configuration push function | function | restricted | Bulk push of configuration to managed devices. |
| Northbound API | network | confidential | REST/GraphQL interface consumed by operator tooling. |
| Operator account | user related | restricted | Administrator identities and role assignments. |
| Audit and telemetry log | data | confidential | Record of who changed what across the managed estate. |
Assets to add: [anything specific to your architecture, such as third-party services, hardware security modules or region-specific data stores]
An asset is anything an attacker would want to reach, break or abuse. Delete rows that do not exist in your product and add the ones that make yours different, since generic inventories produce generic threats. Classify each asset by the harm its exposure would cause rather than by where it happens to be stored.
3. Threat analysis (STRIDE)
Annex I Part I (2), Article 13(2)| Threat | STRIDE | Asset | L / I | Annex I ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| An attacker exploits known, not fixed vulnerabilities in the product under review. | elevation of privilege | Controller application | high / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(a) |
| An attacker exploits a vulnerability for which a security update is available but not installed. | elevation of privilege | Controller application | high / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(c) |
| An attacker exploits a weakness in the default configuration of the product under review. | elevation of privilege | Controller application | high / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(b) |
| An attacker gains unauthorized access to the product under review. | elevation of privilege | Configuration push function | high / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(d) |
| An attacker discloses confidential data stored in the product under review. | information disclosure | Managed-device credentials | medium / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(e) |
| An attacker tampers stored data in the product under review. | tampering | Device configuration store | medium / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(f) |
| An attacker tampers with data processed by the product under review and remains undetected. | repudiation | Audit and telemetry log | medium / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(f) |
| An attacker gains unauthorized access to the product under review. | elevation of privilege | Northbound API | high / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(d) |
| An attacker impacts the availability of basic or essential functions after an incident. | denial of service | Controller application | medium / high | ANNEX I Part I (2)(h) |
| An attacker performs a security-relevant activity that is not recorded or monitored by the product under review. | repudiation | Operator account | medium / medium | ANNEX I Part I (2)(l) |
Each threat is tied to an asset and to an Annex I Part I essential requirement, which is what an authority will ask you to evidence. Likelihood and impact here are starting values from the CRA threat catalogue. Re-score them against your own deployment: an interface that is unreachable in your architecture is not a medium risk just because the catalogue says so.
4. Risk criteria
Annex I Part I (1), Article 13(3), Annex VII| Scale | Level | Score | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| likelihood | Rare | 1 | Exceptional occurrence. Highly unlikely during the product lifecycle. |
| likelihood | Unlikely | 2 | Could occur, but only under limited circumstances or with significant effort. |
| likelihood | Possible | 3 | Realistic occurrence under credible attack conditions. |
| likelihood | Likely | 4 | Expected to occur in multiple realistic scenarios or repeated attempts. |
| likelihood | Almost Certain | 5 | Expected to occur frequently or with minimal attacker effort. |
| impact | Negligible | 1 | Minimal operational disruption and no meaningful cybersecurity consequence. |
| impact | Minor | 2 | Limited disruption or localized loss with low recovery effort. |
| impact | Moderate | 3 | Noticeable service disruption, data exposure, or recovery effort requiring management attention. |
| impact | Major | 4 | Severe business disruption, major data compromise, or significant recovery cost. |
| impact | Catastrophic | 5 | Critical operational failure, widespread compromise, safety implications, or major regulatory impact. |
Document the scales before you score anything, otherwise the scoring is unfalsifiable. These are the default five-by-five scales. Adjust the wording so it reflects consequences your organisation actually recognises, and state your risk acceptance threshold explicitly.
5. Risk treatment and mitigations
Annex I Part I (2), Article 13(1)- Controller application: Address known exploitable vulnerabilities before release and maintain an effective vulnerability management process.
- Controller application: Ensure timely deployment of security updates and monitor update compliance.
- Controller application: Harden default settings, minimise enabled services, and require secure initial configuration.
- Configuration push function: Enforce role separation and step-up authentication before a bulk configuration push.
- Managed-device credentials: Store managed-device secrets in an encrypted vault keyed separately from the application database.
- Device configuration store: Version and integrity-check golden configurations so a tampered template cannot be pushed silently.
- Audit and telemetry log: Append-only logging with off-box shipping so an intruder cannot erase their own trail.
- Northbound API: Scope API tokens per integration and expire them on a defined rotation.
- Controller application: Provide recovery mechanisms, resilience planning, and secure restoration of essential functions.
- Operator account: Log and monitor security-relevant events by default and protect monitoring evidence.
For each risk, record: treatment (accept / mitigate / transfer / avoid), the control that implements it, the residual score after treatment, and the owner.
Accepted risks: [list, with the justification and who accepted them]
A mitigation that is not implemented is not a mitigation. Point each line at a real control, a configuration default or a design decision you can evidence. Accepted risks are legitimate, but they need a named accepter and a reason that survives scrutiny.
6. Vulnerability handling and reporting readiness
Annex I Part II, Article 13(8), Article 14Coordinated vulnerability disclosure contact: [security.txt URL, security contact]
Support period: [end date, per Article 13(8)]
SBOM: [format, where it is maintained]
Article 14 reporting: actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents are reported to ENISA and the CSIRT within 24 hours (early warning) and 72 hours (notification).
Named responsible person: [name, role]
The risk assessment is one half of Annex I. Part II obligations run for the whole support period, so the reporting path has to exist before you place the product on the market, ready ahead of your first exploited vulnerability.
Start this assessment in CVD Portal
Create the product and CVD Portal pre-fills this asset inventory, the matching STRIDE threats and your risk criteria, ready to review and adjust.
Start the assessment