← Industry Guides
Industrial & ManufacturingCRA Guide

EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide for Robotics & Collaborative Robot Manufacturers

Default class for most robots, AMRs and cobot platforms, because Annex III lists no robot or machinery category

Robotics and collaborative robot (cobot) manufacturers placing industrial robots, autonomous mobile robots (AMRs), and cobot platforms on the EU market must address CRA obligations alongside existing Machinery Regulation requirements. Most robots, AMRs and cobot platforms are default-class products under the CRA, because Annex III lists no robot or machinery category and classification follows a product's core functionality (Article 7(1)).

Article 13Article 14Annex IAnnex IIIArticle 20
Deadline: 11 December 2027Classification: Default class for most robots, AMRs and cobot platforms, because Annex III lists no robot or machinery category

Last updated 13 November 2026

CRA Scope and Classification for Robotic Systems

Industrial robots, collaborative robots (cobots), autonomous mobile robots (AMRs), robot operating system (ROS)-based platforms, and robotic management software are products with digital elements within CRA scope when they include network interfaces, remote management capabilities, or software that receives external updates.

Most robots, AMRs and cobot platforms are default-class products. A product is important only when its core functionality matches a category in Annex III (Article 7(1)), and Annex III lists no robot, cobot or machinery category. Remote programming, telemetry, over-the-air updates and work next to people do not change the class. They raise the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment has to address. Integrating an Annex III component, such as an operating system or a network switch, does not by itself make the robot an important product (Article 7(1)).

A home robot can be different. When its core functionality is that of a smart home general purpose virtual assistant, a smart home product with security functions or an internet-connected toy with social interactive or location tracking features, it is a Class I important product (Annex III). Record the core functionality and the reason for the class in the technical documentation.

The Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 governs the health and safety of robotic systems and applies from 20 January 2027. Its Annex III sections 1.1.9 and 1.2.1 require protection against corruption and control systems that withstand reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts. The CRA governs the cybersecurity of the digital elements. Both apply to a connected robot, with one EU declaration of conformity and one CE marking. See CRA and the Machinery Regulation.

CRA reference:Article 7(1), Article 13(2), Annex III

Annex I Security Requirements for Robotic Systems

Robotic systems present unique Annex I challenges because cybersecurity failures can have direct physical safety consequences - unauthorised manipulation of a robot's motion parameters can injure workers or damage equipment:

  • Authenticated control interfaces: All interfaces accepting motion commands, program uploads, or configuration changes must require strong authentication. Remote programming APIs must not accept unauthenticated commands.
  • Integrity-protected firmware: Robot controller firmware must be cryptographically signed and verified. Firmware downgrades to known-vulnerable versions must be prevented.
  • Network segmentation support: Robots must support operation in segmented OT networks. Management interfaces must be separable from production data interfaces.
  • Fail-safe behaviour: If network connectivity or authentication mechanisms fail, the robot must default to a safe state - not a state that allows unrestricted operation.
  • Audit logging: All programming events, parameter changes, operator logins, and remote access sessions must be logged with timestamps and attribution. lets the user opt out of security logging. For a robot that is machinery, the opt-out must not stop the logs of the Machinery Regulation. Its Annex III, section 1.2.1(f) requires a tracing log of interventions and of the safety software versions uploaded after placing on the market, kept for five years after each upload. Keep the two logs apart, or limit the opt-out to the CRA part.
CRA reference:Annex I

CVD Policy and Article 13 for Robotics Vendors

Robotics manufacturers typically focus security resources on functional safety (ISO 10218, ISO/TS 15066 for cobots) rather than cybersecurity, and many lack formal CVD policies. Article 13 requires a publicly accessible CVD policy covering all products with digital elements - including robot controllers, programming pendants, and fleet management software.

  • Define a clear scope covering all network-connected robotic products
  • Specify a secure submission channel for researchers and operators
  • Include a commitment to prioritising vulnerabilities that could affect worker safety
  • Coordinate with customers (factory operators) before public disclosure, given that unpatched robot vulnerabilities in production environments represent an immediate occupational safety risk

CVD Portal can serve as the intake channel for the CVD policy, with triage functionality that supports escalation of safety-critical disclosures to immediate internal response.

CRA reference:Article 13(1), and

Article 14 Incident Reporting for Robotics

Active exploitation of robotics vulnerabilities is a relatively novel threat scenario, but the consequences - production disruption, physical injury, corporate espionage via manufacturing data theft - make Article 14 compliance critical. The 24-hour ENISA notification requirement applies when exploitation is confirmed.

  • Unauthorised remote access to production robots used for corporate sabotage or data exfiltration
  • Ransomware deployment targeting robot controllers to disrupt production
  • Manipulation of robot program parameters by an insider or external attacker

Manufacturers should establish monitoring capabilities - ideally in coordination with their industrial operator customers - that can detect exploitation signals. The 24-hour notification to ENISA must identify the affected product, the nature of the exploitation, and any immediate mitigations such as isolating affected systems from the network. Parallel notification to affected factory operator customers is essential given production safety implications.

CRA reference:Article 14(1), Article 14(2)

Conformity Assessment and Machinery Regulation Alignment

A default-class robot can use Module A self-assessment (Article 32(1)). Module A is open to an Annex III Class I product only when it fully applies a harmonised standard, a common specification or an EUCC scheme (Article 32(2)), and no CRA harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal yet.

The Machinery Regulation has its own procedures. Machinery Regulation Article 25(2) requires a notified body for every category in its Annex I, Part A, and that list includes safety components and embedded systems with self-evolving behaviour that use machine learning to ensure safety functions. The two conformity assessments are carried out separately and both acts go into one EU declaration of conformity (CRA Article 28(3)). A manufacturer that uses a notified body for both can ask whether the same body is notified under each act.

Many robot arms are supplied as partly completed machinery. Under the Machinery Regulation, the arm gets a declaration of incorporation and assembly instructions, and the CE marking follows only for the completed machine. Under the CRA, the arm is a product with digital elements in its own right. From 11 December 2027 it needs its own EU declaration of conformity and CE marking (Article 28, Article 30). That marking does not cover the machinery safety of the finished robot cell.

  1. Annex I Part I cybersecurity requirements for the digital elements (controller software, remote interfaces)
  2. Annex I Part II vulnerability management - SBOM, patch process, CVD policy
  3. The relationship between cybersecurity measures and functional safety measures (the two must not conflict)
  4. Technical file completeness

Robotics manufacturers should note that IEC 62443 (industrial cybersecurity) provides a directly applicable framework for robot controller cybersecurity that aligns with CRA Annex I. Vendors investing in IEC 62443-4-2 component certification should position this as CRA conformity supporting evidence.

CRA reference:Article 28, Article 30, Article 32, Annex VIII

Work through the CRA for each product in one workspace.

Classify each product, build the Annex VII technical file and prepare Article 14 notifications. The disclosure portal that receives vulnerability reports stays free.

Frequently asked

Does the Machinery Regulation cover cybersecurity for robots, or is the CRA additional?+

Both apply. The Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230, which applies from 20 January 2027, requires protection against corruption (Annex III, section 1.1.9) and control systems that withstand reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts leading to a hazardous situation (section 1.2.1). Those requirements protect safety. The CRA adds obligations the Machinery Regulation does not have, including vulnerability handling, a CVD policy, security updates through the support period and Article 14 reporting. CRA compliance can help show compliance with sections 1.1.9 and 1.2.1, but the manufacturer has to demonstrate that link (CRA recital 53), and the conformity assessment of each act still applies.

Are autonomous mobile robots (AMRs) used in logistics subject to the CRA?+

Yes. AMRs deployed in logistics - warehouse picking robots, autonomous forklifts, delivery robots operating in public spaces - are products with digital elements that are within CRA scope when placed on the EU market. Annex III lists no robot category, so most AMRs are default-class products whatever their connectivity or their work near people. The Machinery Regulation also applies to them as machinery. Vendors should also note that AMRs operating on public roads may be subject to additional type-approval requirements.

How do we handle software vulnerabilities in the ROS (Robot Operating System) middleware our robots use?+

ROS components embedded in your robot products are part of your product's SBOM and your responsibility under the CRA. You must monitor for vulnerabilities in the ROS packages you use (including upstream ROS 2 packages), assess their impact on your product, obtain or develop patches, and deliver security updates to your customers. The ROS security working group and ROS 2's security architecture provide resources for managing ROS vulnerabilities, but the CRA obligation to patch and update sits with you as the product manufacturer. Consider whether your robot products are running ROS versions that are still actively maintained upstream.

Does a system integrator or a factory that modifies a robot become its manufacturer?+

It depends on the act. Under the CRA, an importer or distributor that substantially modifies a robot already on the market becomes its manufacturer, also when it keeps the robot (Article 21). Any other person becomes the manufacturer only when it substantially modifies the robot and makes it available on the market (Article 22(1)). A factory that modifies a robot for its own use stays a user under the CRA. Under the Machinery Regulation, the person who carries out a substantial modification becomes the manufacturer (Machinery Regulation Article 18), also when it keeps the machine. There, a substantial modification is a physical or digital change, not foreseen or planned by the manufacturer, that creates a new hazard or increases an existing risk. The change must also require added guards or protective devices that need a modification of the existing safety control system, or additional protective measures for stability or mechanical strength (Machinery Regulation Article 3(16)). A retrofit that does not meet these conditions does not make the factory a manufacturer. An integrator that builds a robot cell is normally the manufacturer of that assembly under the Machinery Regulation. One retrofit that meets these conditions can therefore make an operator a manufacturer under the Machinery Regulation and leave it a user under the CRA.

Can a cybersecurity weakness in a robot lead to product liability?+

Yes. Directive (EU) 2024/2853 on liability for defective products applies to products placed on the market or put into service after 9 December 2026 (Article 2(1) of that directive). A court takes safety-relevant cybersecurity requirements into account when it assesses whether a product is defective (Article 7(2)(f) of that directive). The manufacturer stays liable for a defect caused by a missing safety update, while the update is within its control (Article 11(2)(c) of that directive). See the Product Liability Directive and the CRA.

Guides for related sectors

Chemical & Process Plant Automation VendorsChemical and process plant automation vendors supply distributed control systems (DCS), safety instrumented systems (SIS), and process SCADA platforms to EU chemical manufacturers. Annex III lists no DCS, SIS or SCADA category, so these products are default class under the CRA (Article 7(1)). Automation system failure in chemical production can have catastrophic consequences, and the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment must address them. The intersection of CRA cybersecurity requirements with Seveso III Directive major accident prevention obligations creates a complex dual regulatory framework. CRA compliance for chemical automation vendors is not only a market access requirement but a fundamental component of major hazard risk management.Facilities Management & CAFM System VendorsVendors of computer-aided facilities management (CAFM) software, integrated workplace management systems (IWMS), and IoT-connected building maintenance platforms sold to EU customers are manufacturers of products with digital elements under the CRA. CAFM systems increasingly integrate with building management systems, access control, energy management, and workplace sensor networks - creating complex connected architectures that must be secured under Annex I. Vendors must have incident notification capabilities in place for 11 September 2026, when Article 14 applies, and CVD programmes in place for 11 December 2027.Food & Beverage Automation System VendorsFood and beverage automation vendors supplying SCADA systems, batch controllers, filling line automation, and quality control inspection systems to EU food manufacturers must comply with the CRA as manufacturers of products with digital elements. The food industry's increasing connectivity - driven by Industry 4.0 adoption and supply chain traceability requirements - significantly expands the attack surface that must be addressed under Annex I. Ransomware attacks on food processing plants have demonstrated the severe operational consequences of inadequate OT security.HVAC & Climate Control ManufacturersHVAC and climate control manufacturers placing networked heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration systems on the EU market must comply with the EU Cyber Resilience Act. Article 14 incident reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the remaining obligations apply from 11 December 2027. Connected HVAC controllers, building management system (BMS) integration gateways, and smart thermostats are products with digital elements. Most HVAC products, including smart thermostats and commercial HVAC controllers with BMS integration, are default class, because Annex III lists no HVAC or building automation category. A gateway whose core functionality is a router or a modem for connection to the internet is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12).

This industry guide is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.

Start a CRA risk assessment for Robotics & Collaborative Robot Manufacturers

A pre-filled classification, asset inventory and STRIDE threat analysis for this product type, free to copy or seed into the app.

Open the starter →