← Industry Guides
TelecommunicationsCRA Guide

EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide for Private 5G & Industrial Wireless Vendors

Important Class I for wireless access points, routers, switches and cellular internet modems (Annex III, point 12) and for network management systems (Annex III, point 6). Important Class II for firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems. Default class for a gNB or 5G core function whose core functionality matches no listed category

Vendors of private 5G network equipment, industrial Wi-Fi infrastructure, and CBRS/NR-U industrial wireless systems deployed in EU manufacturing, logistics, and critical infrastructure environments face CRA obligations as manufacturers of products with digital elements. Classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)). Industrial wireless access points, routers, switches and cellular modems for connection to the internet are Important Class I (Annex III, point 12). Network management systems, including SDN controllers, are Important Class I (Annex III, point 6). A gNB or a 5G core function is default class unless its core functionality matches a listed category. The intersection of CRA obligations and Radio Equipment Directive (RED) cybersecurity delegated act requirements creates a dual compliance framework for wireless equipment vendors.

Article 13Article 14Annex IAnnex IIIArticle 13Article 17Article 6
Deadline: 11 December 2027Classification: Important Class I for wireless access points, routers, switches and cellular internet modems (Annex III, point 12) and for network management systems (Annex III, point 6). Important Class II for firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems. Default class for a gNB or 5G core function whose core functionality matches no listed category

Last updated 7 November 2026

CRA Scope and Interaction with RED Delegated Act

Private 5G gNBs (base stations), 5G core network components (AMF, SMF, UPF), network management systems (NMS), and industrial wireless access points - when placed on the EU market as standalone commercial products - are products with digital elements subject to the CRA. The Radio Equipment Directive (RED) Delegated Act (EU 2022/30) imposes cybersecurity requirements on internet-connected radio equipment, including privacy, fraud protection, and network harm prevention requirements. From 1 August 2025, RED delegated act compliance is mandatory for affected radio equipment. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/339 repeals the delegated act from 11 December 2027. The CRA adds further security requirements. Its Article 14 reporting obligations apply from 11 September 2026, and its other obligations apply from 11 December 2027. Until 10 December 2027, vendors must map their obligations under both frameworks. The RED delegated act covers internet-connected radio equipment, and the CRA covers all products with digital elements, including enterprise and industrial network infrastructure. A product subject to both must comply with both until the repeal takes effect.

Classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)). Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392 places wireless access points, as bridges, and cellular modems for connection to the internet in Annex III, point 12, together with routers and switches. These products are Important Class I in every market, consumer, enterprise or industrial. A network management system, including an SDN controller, is Important Class I (Annex III, point 6). A firewall or an intrusion detection and prevention system is Important Class II (Annex III, Class II, point 2). A gNB, an AMF, an SMF or a UPF matches no category by name. Each one is Important Class I when its core functionality is a router or a switch, and default class otherwise. The role of the network as the connectivity layer of a facility does not change the class. It raises the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment has to address.

CRA reference:Article 3(1), Article 7(1), Article 13(2), Annex III, Article 2(1)

Technical Security Obligations for 5G Infrastructure

Private 5G network infrastructure is itself security-critical - it provides the connectivity layer for industrial IoT, robotics, automated guided vehicles, and operational technology systems in factories and logistics facilities. Annex I requirements for 5G vendors include: implementing authenticated and encrypted management plane communications for all gNB and core network management interfaces; eliminating default administrative credentials and requiring strong credential setup on initial deployment; providing cryptographically signed firmware updates with rollback protection; supporting network slicing isolation controls where applicable; maintaining audit logs of all configuration changes and management access events; and implementing network-level security controls protecting attached devices from attacks routed through the private 5G network. The SBOM must cover all software components in the gNB and core network, including open-source 5G stack components (e.g. OpenAirInterface, free5GC) that are increasingly used in private 5G implementations.

CRA reference:Annex I Parts I and II

CVD Policy Under Article 13 for Telecommunications Vendors

Article 13 mandates a published CVD policy. Telecommunications infrastructure vendors face active security research communities - 5G protocol vulnerabilities are regularly published at academic and industry security conferences. The CVD policy must: establish a dedicated security reporting channel separate from general customer support; define researcher acknowledgment timelines and disclosure handling procedures; address coordination with national CSIRTs for telecommunications infrastructure vulnerabilities, given the critical infrastructure implications; and specify how security updates and advisories are communicated to operators of deployed private 5G networks. For vendors with both enterprise and carrier-grade 5G product lines, the CVD policy should address differences in disclosure handling between consumer-facing and operator-grade products. GSMA's Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure guidelines provide a useful framework complement to the CRA requirements.

CRA reference: and , Article 13(7)

Article 14 Incident Reporting for Network Infrastructure

Article 14 requires notification to the relevant national CSIRT within 24 hours of confirmed active exploitation. For private 5G vendors, exploitation of a gNB or core network vulnerability could compromise the connectivity of an entire industrial facility - affecting manufacturing operations, autonomous vehicle guidance, or industrial control system communications depending on what runs over the private 5G network. The downstream consequences of a private 5G network compromise depend entirely on the applications it supports, and vendors must communicate this amplification risk to customers in security advisories. Vendors with products deployed in critical infrastructure sectors - energy, water, healthcare - should maintain pre-established contact channels with the relevant sector CSIRTs in addition to the general national CSIRT notification process.

CRA reference:Article 14(1), Article 14(2), Article 14(3)

Conformity Assessment: CRA and RED Coordination

Private 5G equipment subject to both RED delegated act and CRA conformity requirements should coordinate assessments to leverage shared technical documentation. For radio equipment, RED conformity may use harmonised standards that overlap with CRA Annex I requirements. The CRA technical file must additionally cover: SBOM; CVD policy; Article 14 notification procedures; and post-market vulnerability monitoring specific to CRA obligations. Core network software components (AMF, SMF, UPF) that are sold as software-only products are not covered by RED but remain fully in scope under CRA. A default-class product can use Module A internal control (Article 32(1)). A Class I product, such as a wireless access point or a network management system, can use Module A only when it fully applies a harmonised standard, a common specification or a European cybersecurity certification scheme at assurance level substantial or higher (Article 32(2)). No CRA harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal yet, so a Class I product needs a notified body for now (Module B plus Module C, or Module H). A Class II product, such as a firewall, always needs Module B plus Module C, Module H, or a European cybersecurity certification scheme specified under Article 27(9) at assurance level substantial or higher, for the requirements it covers (Article 32(3)). Vendors should verify the CRA class of each product early, because the class decides the conformity route.

CRA reference:Article 32, Annex VIII

Work through the CRA for each product in one workspace.

Classify each product, build the Annex VII technical file and prepare Article 14 notifications. The disclosure portal that receives vulnerability reports stays free.

Frequently asked

We supply private 5G infrastructure to a system integrator who deploys it for end customers. Are we or the integrator responsible for CRA compliance?+

As the original manufacturer of the 5G equipment, you bear CRA obligations for the security of your products regardless of how they reach the end customer. The system integrator who deploys your equipment becomes a 'distributor' under the CRA unless they substantially modify the product, in which case they assume manufacturer obligations for the modified system. Supply contracts should clearly define: your obligations as equipment manufacturer (Annex I security requirements, CVD policy, Article 14 notification); the integrator's obligations for deployment security (network architecture, configuration); and the customer's operational security responsibilities. This allocation does not reduce your obligations - it clarifies parallel responsibilities.

Our private 5G core uses open-source 5G stack components. How do we handle SBOM and vulnerability monitoring for these components?+

Open-source 5G stack components (such as free5GC, Open5GS, or OpenAirInterface) are in scope for your SBOM obligations just as proprietary components are. Use software composition analysis tooling to generate machine-readable SBOMs from your core network software builds. Monitor OSV.dev, NVD, and project-specific security advisories for CVEs affecting your open-source components. When critical vulnerabilities are identified in upstream open-source projects, you must assess impact, develop patches or workarounds, and issue updates to customers. The pace of open-source vulnerability disclosure in the 5G stack is significant - automated SBOM vulnerability scanning integrated into your CI/CD pipeline is strongly advisable.

How do the CRA's security update obligations apply to 5G firmware deployed on customer-managed hardware?+

You are obligated to make security updates available without undue delay for all supported products - you cannot fulfil this obligation solely by developing a patch without providing customers with a straightforward update delivery mechanism. For private 5G equipment on customer-managed hardware, this means providing: documented update procedures; update packages with integrity verification; release notes that clearly identify the security issues resolved; and customer advisories specifying the urgency and recommended installation timeline for each update. Customers who delay applying security updates are making their own risk decisions - your obligation is to ensure the update is available, documented, and communicated. Contractual provisions should clarify customer responsibility for timely patch application.

This industry guide is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.

Start a CRA risk assessment for Private 5G & Industrial Wireless Vendors

A pre-filled classification, asset inventory and STRIDE threat analysis for this product type, free to copy or seed into the app.

Open the starter →