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HealthcareCRA Guide

EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide for Point-of-Care Diagnostics & IVD Manufacturers

Outside the CRA for in vitro diagnostic medical devices under Regulation (EU) 2017/746, including their software. Products that are not devices, such as research use only instruments, are default class unless their core functionality matches an Annex III category

The Cyber Resilience Act does not apply to in vitro diagnostic medical devices under Regulation (EU) 2017/746, the IVDR (Article 2(2)(b)). Connected blood analysers, point-of-care PCR systems and IVD software that are devices under that Regulation are therefore outside the CRA. Their cybersecurity follows the general safety and performance requirements of the IVDR. Products that are not devices stay in CRA scope, for example research use only instruments and laboratory data software with no medical purpose. Those products are default class unless their core functionality matches an Annex III category. A manufacturer with products under both regimes must decide the regulatory qualification of each product first.

Article 13Article 14Annex IAnnex IIIArticle 13Article 17
Deadline: 11 December 2027Classification: Outside the CRA for in vitro diagnostic medical devices under Regulation (EU) 2017/746, including their software. Products that are not devices, such as research use only instruments, are default class unless their core functionality matches an Annex III category

Last updated 26 October 2026

CRA Scope and IVDR Interaction

In vitro diagnostic instruments with digital interfaces, such as connected blood gas analysers, haematology analysers with LIS (laboratory information system) interfaces, point-of-care PCR and lateral flow readers with data transmission, and diagnostic software, are in vitro diagnostic medical devices when their manufacturer intends them for the in vitro examination of specimens for a medical purpose. Regulation (EU) 2017/746 then applies, and the CRA does not (Article 2(2)(b)). The general safety and performance requirements in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2017/746 cover IT security for those devices. The IVDR risk class does not change this. A Class A IVD is outside the CRA in the same way as a Class D IVD.

Products that are not devices under Regulation (EU) 2017/746 stay in CRA scope. Examples can include an instrument sold for research use only, with no medical purpose, and laboratory data software that only stores or transfers results. Their class follows core functionality (Article 7(1)). Annex III lists no diagnostic or laboratory category, so these products are default class unless their core functionality matches a listed category, such as a router or a switch (Annex III, point 12). Record the regulatory qualification of each product in its technical documentation.

CRA reference:Article 2(2), Article 7(1), Annex III

Technical Security for Diagnostic Instruments and Connectivity

Point-of-care diagnostic instruments are increasingly integrated into clinical networks - connected to LIS, EHR systems, and cloud-based result repositories. This connectivity creates attack surfaces that did not exist in standalone instrument generations. CRA Annex I applies only to products in CRA scope. For an IVD, the same measures support the IT security requirements of Regulation (EU) 2017/746. Annex I security requirements for IVD manufacturers include: encrypting all result data transmissions using current TLS standards; implementing authenticated access to instrument management interfaces, including local touchscreens and remote service ports; ensuring that diagnostic result integrity is maintained and any modification to transmitted results is detectable through cryptographic checksums or signing; eliminating default service credentials used by field engineers, replacing them with individual authenticated service accounts; and providing firmware update mechanisms that do not require instrument downtime during routine clinical use where operationally feasible. The SBOM must cover both the instrument firmware and any companion middleware used for result routing and LIS integration.

CRA reference:Annex I Parts I and II

CVD Policy Under Article 13 for Diagnostic Manufacturers

requires a published CVD policy for each product in CRA scope. One CVD policy can cover devices and in-scope products. For an IVD, vulnerability handling is part of the post-market surveillance under Regulation (EU) 2017/746, including the periodic safety update report (PSUR) for Class C and D IVDs. A vulnerability discovered in a diagnostic instrument that could affect result accuracy or data integrity may simultaneously be a safety issue requiring notification under IVDR Article 82 (serious incidents) and a cybersecurity issue requiring CVD handling. The CVD policy must specify how these two reporting streams are coordinated, who has authority to make IVDR safety notifications versus CRA cybersecurity notifications, and how the manufacturer communicates security updates to laboratory customers without disrupting clinical operations. Healthcare-specific disclosure timelines may be longer than typical software CVD timelines due to the need to validate that security patches do not affect diagnostic performance.

CRA reference: and , Article 13(7)

Article 14 Incident Reporting in Clinical Settings

Article 14 applies only to products in CRA scope. For those products, the manufacturer sends an early warning of an actively exploited vulnerability within 24 hours. For diagnostic instruments, exploitation scenarios - result data tampering, unauthorised result access, instrument command injection - could affect patient diagnoses and treatment decisions. Manufacturers must maintain monitoring capabilities that can detect anomalous access to diagnostic instruments or unusual patterns in result transmission data. The 24-hour notification window requires pre-established incident response procedures. For an IVD, the reporting route is Regulation (EU) 2017/746, Article 82. A serious incident goes to the competent authority no later than 15 days after the manufacturer becomes aware of it. The limit is 2 days for a serious public health threat and 10 days for a death or an unanticipated serious deterioration in a person's state of health. One incident response procedure should send each incident to the correct route.

CRA reference:Article 14(1), Article 14(2), Article 14(3)

IVDR and CRA Conformity Assessment

An IVD follows the conformity assessment of Regulation (EU) 2017/746 only. The CRA adds no conformity assessment for it, whatever its IVDR risk class. For a product in CRA scope, the route follows the CRA class. A default-class product can use Module A internal control (Article 32(1)). An Important Class I product can use Module A only when the manufacturer fully applies a harmonised standard, a common specification or a European cybersecurity certification scheme at assurance level at least substantial (Article 32(2)). No CRA harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal yet, so today a Class I product needs a notified body (Module B plus Module C, or Module H). Risk management, security architecture and post-market surveillance records prepared for Regulation (EU) 2017/746 can be reused in the CRA technical documentation of in-scope products. Manufacturers should complete the regulatory qualification of each product before they plan its conformity assessment.

CRA reference:Article 2(2), Article 32, Annex VIII

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Frequently asked

Our point-of-care analyser is connected to the hospital LIS but operates in a restricted clinical network. Does 'network connectivity' still bring us in scope?+

Not when the analyser is an IVD. A point-of-care analyser that is an in vitro diagnostic medical device under Regulation (EU) 2017/746 is outside the CRA (Article 2(2)(b)), whatever its network connections. Its cybersecurity follows that Regulation. An analyser with no medical purpose, such as a research use only model, is a product with digital elements when it can connect to a device or network. The type of network does not matter. An Ethernet link to a LIS on an air-gapped, VLAN-segmented or otherwise restricted network still counts. Deployment context then changes the risk assessment (Article 13(2)) and does not change scope.

How does CRA SBOM disclosure interact with our trade-secret obligations for diagnostic algorithm software?+

This applies to products in CRA scope. An IVD under Regulation (EU) 2017/746 has no CRA SBOM duty. The CRA requires you to maintain an SBOM - it does not require you to publicly disclose it. The SBOM must be available to market surveillance authorities on request but is not required to be published. Component-level SBOM information (package names, versions, known CVEs) does not typically constitute disclosure of trade-secret algorithms. Proprietary diagnostic algorithm components should be listed in the SBOM with sufficient identification to support vulnerability tracking, but the algorithmic logic itself is not part of the SBOM. Consult legal counsel to determine appropriate SBOM disclosure levels for components where trade secret concerns are most acute.

We discovered a vulnerability in our diagnostic software that could theoretically allow result manipulation. Do we notify CSIRT even before we know if it has been exploited?+

If the software is an IVD under Regulation (EU) 2017/746, the CRA and its Article 14 do not apply. Assess the vulnerability under the vigilance and post-market surveillance rules of that Regulation instead. For software in CRA scope, Article 14 works as follows. The CRA's 24-hour notification obligation under Article 14 is triggered when you become aware of an actively exploited vulnerability - not by vulnerability discovery alone. Discovery of a vulnerability without evidence of exploitation does not trigger the 24-hour notification. However, you must report the vulnerability through your own CVD process, issue a security update without undue delay, and communicate the update and interim mitigations to customers. If, during your investigation, you determine the vulnerability has been actively exploited, the 24-hour clock starts from the point you become aware of the exploitation. Document your investigation timeline carefully.

Guides for related sectors

Telemedicine & Remote Patient Monitoring VendorsThe CRA does not apply to products to which Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (MDR) or Regulation (EU) 2017/746 (IVDR) applies (Article 2(2)). A telemedicine or remote patient monitoring (RPM) product that is a medical device is regulated for cybersecurity under the MDR. Vendors must determine precisely which products are medical devices under the MDR and which are software or connectivity products outside it. Those other products are in CRA scope and are classified by core functionality (Article 7(1)). Security failures in RPM devices - which transmit real-time physiological data from patients' homes - carry both patient safety and data protection consequences, making robust security engineering a clinical as well as regulatory obligation.Electronic Health Record & Clinical IT VendorsElectronic health record (EHR) and clinical IT vendors selling software to EU healthcare providers face obligations under both the CRA and the emerging European Health Data Space (EHDS) regulation. EHR systems are critical healthcare infrastructure - their compromise directly affects patient safety, treatment continuity, and the confidentiality of some of the most sensitive personal data categories under GDPR. Ransomware attacks on hospital EHR systems have repeatedly caused patient harm through care disruption, making CRA compliance an urgent clinical safety matter as well as a regulatory obligation.Healthcare IT & Clinical Software VendorsHealthcare IT and clinical software vendors providing electronic health record systems, clinical decision support software, hospital information systems, laboratory information management systems, and health data integration platforms to EU healthcare organisations must comply with the EU Cyber Resilience Act. Article 14 incident reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the remaining obligations apply from 11 December 2027. Software that is a medical device under Regulation (EU) 2017/745 or an in vitro diagnostic medical device under Regulation (EU) 2017/746 is outside the CRA (Article 2(2)). Other healthcare software with digital elements is in scope and is default class unless its core functionality matches an Annex III category. Patient data, clinical networks and links to medical devices do not change the class.Home Health Monitoring Device ManufacturersManufacturers of connected home health devices, such as blood pressure monitors, pulse oximeters, blood glucose meters and smart scales, must first check whether each device is a medical device. A medical device under Regulation (EU) 2017/745 and an in vitro diagnostic medical device under Regulation (EU) 2017/746 are outside the CRA (Article 2(2)). Connected wellness devices with no medical purpose are in CRA scope. A wellness wearable with a health monitoring purpose is Important Class I (Annex III, point 19), and other wellness devices are default class. These devices collect sensitive physiological data in consumer home environments and must meet stringent security-by-design standards. The consumer deployment context means that usability and security must be engineered together, with automatic update mechanisms and clear end-of-support policies particularly important.

This industry guide is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.

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