EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide for Medical Device Manufacturers
Outside the CRA for medical devices under Regulation (EU) 2017/745, including medical device software. Products that are not devices are default class unless their core functionality matches an Annex III category. Important Class I for a health-monitoring wearable that is not a medical device (Annex III, point 19)
The Cyber Resilience Act does not apply to medical devices under Regulation (EU) 2017/745, the MDR, or to in vitro diagnostic medical devices under Regulation (EU) 2017/746, the IVDR (Article 2(2)). Software as a Medical Device (SaMD) that is a device under those Regulations is also outside the CRA. The cybersecurity of those devices follows the MDR and IVDR general safety and performance requirements and the guidance MDCG 2019-16. A medical device manufacturer still has CRA obligations for its other products with digital elements, such as wellness wearables and software that is not a device. Those products are default class unless their core functionality matches an Annex III category.
Last updated 26 October 2026
CRA Scope and Classification for Medical Devices
The CRA does not apply to products with digital elements to which Regulation (EU) 2017/745 or Regulation (EU) 2017/746 applies (Article 2(2)(a) and (b)). A connected medical device, an embedded system in a device and Software as a Medical Device (SaMD) are therefore outside the CRA. The intended purpose that the manufacturer gives the product decides whether it is a device. The cybersecurity of a device follows the general safety and performance requirements of Regulation (EU) 2017/745 and the guidance MDCG 2019-16.
A medical device manufacturer can also place products on the market that are not devices, such as wellness wearables, companion software with no medical purpose and hospital IT products. These products are in CRA scope. Their class follows core functionality (Article 7(1)). Annex III lists no medical or clinical category. A personal wearable with a health monitoring purpose that is not a medical device is Important Class I (Annex III, point 19). Other products that are not devices are default class unless their core functionality matches another Annex III category. Patient data, hospital network connections and clinical use do not change the class. They raise the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment has to address. A connected infusion pump with remote monitoring is a medical device and is outside the CRA. Manufacturers should record the regulatory qualification and the CRA classification of each product.
Key Technical Security Obligations for Products in CRA Scope
Annex I Part I of the CRA applies to the products that stay in CRA scope. Its technical requirements are close to the IT security expectations for medical devices. The main requirements are:
- Secure by default configuration: Devices must ship with only the minimum required services enabled. Default credentials are prohibited - a requirement that many legacy medical device platforms currently fail.
- Data confidentiality: Patient data transmitted over networks must be encrypted. Devices integrating HL7 FHIR or DICOM interfaces must protect those channels.
- Authenticated software updates: Firmware updates must be cryptographically signed and verified before installation. Remote update mechanisms must be tamper-resistant.
- Audit logging: Devices must maintain audit logs of security-relevant events accessible to authorised operators.
- SBOM maintenance: A software bill of materials covering all third-party libraries (including medical-specific stacks such as OpenSSL and FHIR libraries) must be maintained and updated throughout the product lifecycle.
MDCG 2019-16 is closely aligned with these requirements, so a manufacturer with mature MDR cybersecurity files has a strong base for the CRA conformity of its in-scope products.
CVD Policy and Article 13 Requirements
requires a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy for each product in CRA scope. For medical devices, MDCG 2019-16 expects vulnerability handling as part of post-market surveillance under Regulation (EU) 2017/745, and FDA cybersecurity guidance applies in the US where relevant. One public CVD channel can serve devices and in-scope products.
The CVD policy must be publicly accessible, typically via a security.txt file and a disclosure page, and must cover all CRA-scoped products. The policy must define submission channels, acknowledgement timelines, and the manufacturer's commitment to remediation. For a medical device, Regulation (EU) 2017/745, Article 87, requires the manufacturer to report serious incidents and field safety corrective actions to the competent authority. That vigilance route is separate from CRA reporting, which covers only in-scope products.
CVD Portal provides a single intake platform that can route disclosures to the internal PSIRT and to the relevant regulatory notification workflows. This reduces coordination overhead for compliance teams that manage MDR obligations for devices and CRA obligations for other products.
Article 14 Reporting and MDR Vigilance
- An early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware
- A vulnerability notification within 72 hours
- A final report no later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available
For a medical device, an exploited vulnerability that affects patient safety, such as unauthorised modification of infusion pump dosing parameters or compromise of a diagnostic algorithm, follows the vigilance rules of Regulation (EU) 2017/745. Under Regulation (EU) 2017/745, Article 87, the manufacturer reports serious incidents and field safety corrective actions (FSCA) to the competent authority. A manufacturer with products under both regimes needs internal procedures that send each incident to the correct route. CVD Portal's Article 14 timeline tool supports deadline tracking from a single incident record.
Conformity Assessment Pathway
A medical device follows the conformity assessment of Regulation (EU) 2017/745 only. The CRA adds no conformity assessment for it. For a product in CRA scope, the route follows the class. A default-class product can use Module A internal control (Article 32(1)). An Important Class I product, such as a wellness wearable with a health monitoring purpose (Annex III, point 19), can use Module A only when the manufacturer fully applies a harmonised standard, a common specification or a European cybersecurity certification scheme at assurance level at least substantial (Article 32(2)). No CRA harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal yet, so today a Class I product needs a notified body (Module B plus Module C, or Module H). A manufacturer that already uses a notified body under Regulation (EU) 2017/745 can ask whether the same body is notified under the CRA. The two assessments stay separate.
- Technical security architecture against Annex I Part I requirements
- Vulnerability management process maturity (Annex I Part II)
- CVD policy operational status
- SBOM completeness and update process
- Post-market surveillance integration with security monitoring
Complete the assessment of each in-scope product before 11 December 2027, when the CRA conformity obligations apply. Evidence generated for MDCG 2019-16, particularly the cybersecurity risk assessment and post-market surveillance plan, can be reused in the CRA technical file of in-scope products.
Work through the CRA for each product in one workspace.
Classify each product, build the Annex VII technical file and prepare Article 14 notifications. The disclosure portal that receives vulnerability reports stays free.
Frequently asked
Does MDR compliance satisfy CRA requirements for medical devices?+
The CRA does not apply to a medical device under Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (Article 2(2)(a)), so the device needs no CRA compliance. Its cybersecurity follows the general safety and performance requirements of that Regulation and MDCG 2019-16. MDR compliance does not cover the manufacturer's other products. A wellness wearable or software that is not a device must meet the CRA in full. That includes the CVD policy (), Article 14 reporting and a conformity assessment under Article 32. Evidence prepared for MDR can be reused in the CRA technical file of those products.
Does SaMD (Software as a Medical Device) fall under the CRA?+
No, when the software is a medical device under Regulation (EU) 2017/745 or an in vitro diagnostic medical device under Regulation (EU) 2017/746 (Article 2(2)(a) and (b)). That covers mobile apps and clinical decision support software that qualify as devices. Software with no medical purpose, such as a wellness app or hospital administration software, is in CRA scope when it is placed on the EU market. Its class follows core functionality (Article 7(1)), so most of that software is default class. Health data and clinical networks do not change the class.
Does the 24-hour Article 14 notification apply to medical device incidents?+
No. Article 14 applies only to products in CRA scope, and a medical device is outside the CRA (Article 2(2)(a)). Device incidents follow the vigilance rules of Regulation (EU) 2017/745, Article 87. For an in-scope product, the clock starts when the manufacturer becomes aware of an actively exploited vulnerability. The early warning is due within 24 hours. The vulnerability notification is due within 72 hours and gives the general nature of the exploit and the corrective or mitigating measures. The final report is due no later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available (Article 14(2)).
Compliance checklists for your products
Key CRA articles for Medical Device Manufacturers
Guides for related sectors
Free CRA tools
This industry guide is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.
Need a CVD policy template for Medical Device Manufacturers?
Download a free CRA-compliant vulnerability disclosure policy and deploy it in minutes.