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Industrial & ManufacturingCRA Guide

EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide for Industrial Automation & PLC Vendors

Default class for most products, including PLCs, DCS, SCADA and HMI. Important Class I for an industrial router, modem or switch (Annex III, point 12). Important Class II for an industrial firewall (Annex III, Class II, point 2)

Industrial automation vendors placing programmable logic controllers, SCADA components, industrial gateways, and HMI systems on the EU market must comply with the EU Cyber Resilience Act. Article 14 incident reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the remaining obligations apply from 11 December 2027. Most OT products, including PLCs, DCS, SCADA and HMI, are default class, because Annex III lists no industrial control category. An industrial router, modem or switch is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12). The CRA introduces mandatory CVD policies and incident reporting obligations that many OT vendors currently lack entirely.

Article 13Article 14Annex IAnnex IIIArticle 13Article 17
Deadline: 11 December 2027Classification: Default class for most products, including PLCs, DCS, SCADA and HMI. Important Class I for an industrial router, modem or switch (Annex III, point 12). Important Class II for an industrial firewall (Annex III, Class II, point 2)

Last updated 26 October 2026

CRA Scope and Classification for OT Products

The CRA applies to PLCs, DCS components, industrial gateways, SCADA servers, HMI terminals, and industrial routers placed on the EU market. Classification follows the core functionality of the product (Article 7(1)). Annex III lists no PLC, DCS, SCADA, HMI or safety instrumented system (SIS) category, so these products are default class. Control of industrial processes, energy distribution or an interface with a SIS does not change the class. It raises the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment has to address.

Deployment in critical infrastructure sectors, such as energy generation, water treatment or the manufacture of hazardous materials, does not change the class either. A PLC with a built-in Ethernet interface and remote programming capability is default class, also when the customer operates it in a critical facility. An operating system integrated in a PLC does not make the PLC an important product (Article 7(1)). Some OT products do match Annex III. An industrial router, a modem for connection to the internet or a switch is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12). A secure remote access gateway whose core functionality is a VPN is Important Class I (Annex III, point 5), and privileged access management for OT systems is Important Class I (Annex III, point 1). An industrial firewall or an intrusion detection and prevention system is Important Class II (Annex III, Class II, point 2).

CRA reference:Article 7(1), Article 13(2), Annex III

Key Technical Security Obligations for Industrial Products

OT product vendors face particularly demanding Annex I obligations because many legacy PLC and SCADA architectures were designed without cybersecurity as a primary concern. The CRA requires:

  • Elimination of default credentials: All PLCs and HMIs must require credential configuration at first use. Factory-default username/password combinations are prohibited.
  • Authenticated firmware updates: Industrial firmware update mechanisms must be cryptographically authenticated. Unauthenticated TFTP-based update paths must be eliminated.
  • Network segmentation support: Devices must support, and ideally enforce, network segmentation - either via built-in firewall rules or by operating correctly in segmented OT network topologies.
  • Audit logging: Devices must generate security-relevant audit logs (login events, configuration changes, firmware updates) accessible to authorised operators.
  • SBOM: A software bill of materials must be maintained, including real-time OS components, protocol stacks (Modbus, PROFINET, EtherNet/IP), and any third-party libraries.

Vendors with products already certified under IEC 62443-4-2 (component security requirements) will find substantial alignment with CRA Annex I obligations.

CRA reference:Annex I

CVD Policy and Article 13 for OT Vendors

Many OT vendors have historically handled vulnerability reports through informal sales or technical support channels, without a formal CVD programme. Article 13 of the CRA makes a formal, publicly disclosed CVD policy mandatory for all products with digital elements.

  • Be publicly accessible via a security.txt file or dedicated security disclosure page
  • Cover all CRA-scoped product lines, including legacy products still within their supported lifetime
  • Define submission channels that are accessible to both sophisticated security researchers and industrial operators who may identify anomalous behaviour in the field
  • Commit to acknowledgement within a defined timeframe and to remediation communication to affected customers

OT vendors should consider that their customer base - manufacturing plants, utilities, infrastructure operators - may have contractual or regulatory obligations that require them to receive timely security advisories. The CVD policy must therefore include a downstream communication commitment, not merely an internal triage process. CVD Portal supports CSAF 2.0 advisory generation for each resolved vulnerability, enabling automated distribution to subscribed asset owners.

CRA reference:Article 13(1), and

Article 14 Incident Reporting for Industrial Vulnerabilities

Article 14 requires ENISA notification within 24 hours of becoming aware that a vulnerability in a product is being actively exploited. For OT vendors, this creates an operational challenge: industrial environments are often air-gapped or minimally monitored, meaning exploitation of a PLC vulnerability may be detected by a customer weeks or months after it begins.

Vendors should establish clear procedures for when the 24-hour clock starts: upon receipt of credible exploitation intelligence, whether from a customer, a security researcher, a national CSIRT, or threat intelligence monitoring. The initial ENISA notification confirms the product and the nature of the exploit; detailed technical content follows in the 72-hour report.

For ICS vulnerabilities, vendors should also co-ordinate with ENISA's ICS-CERT liaison contacts and relevant national CERTs (e.g., BSI in Germany, ANSSI in France) who maintain sectoral oversight of industrial cybersecurity incidents. CVD Portal integrates Article 14 deadline tracking with configurable multi-stakeholder notification workflows.

CRA reference:Article 14(1), Article 14(2)

Conformity Assessment and IEC 62443 Alignment

Default-class OT products can use Module A internal control (Article 32(1)). An Important Class I product, such as an industrial router or switch, can use Module A only when the manufacturer fully applies a harmonised standard, a common specification or a European cybersecurity certification scheme at assurance level at least substantial (Article 32(2)). No CRA harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal yet, so today a Class I product needs a notified body (Module B plus Module C, or Module H). An industrial firewall is Important Class II and always needs Module B plus Module C, Module H or a European cybersecurity certification scheme specified under Article 27(9) at assurance level at least substantial, for the requirements it covers (Article 32(3)). IEC 62443-4-2 certification aligns closely with the Annex I requirements and is strong supporting evidence. It is not a harmonised standard under the CRA and gives no presumption of conformity.

  1. Annex I Part I technical security requirements (secure defaults, update integrity, network access control)
  2. Annex I Part II vulnerability management process (SBOM, patch process, CVD policy)
  3. Technical file completeness - architecture documentation, threat model, conformity declaration
  4. CVD policy operational status

Vendors managing large product portfolios with multiple hardware generations should prioritise products still under active development for compliance remediation; end-of-life products that are nevertheless within their CRA-declared supported lifetime must also satisfy the Annex I Part II ongoing obligations (vulnerability monitoring and patching). Plan notified body engagement early for each Class I or Class II product.

CRA reference:Article 32, Annex VIII

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Frequently asked

Are older PLC products already in the field subject to the CRA?+

The CRA requirements apply to products placed on the EU market from 11 December 2027. A product placed on the market before that date is subject to them only if it is substantially modified from that date (Article 69(2)). Products already installed in customer facilities are therefore not retroactively subject to CRA conformity assessment. However, if a vendor continues to sell the same product model from 11 December 2027, those new placements must be CRA-compliant. Vendors who have committed to continued sales of existing product lines must therefore either bring those products into compliance or discontinue EU sales. Article 14 reporting applies from 11 September 2026 to all in-scope products, also to products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 (Article 69(3)).

Does IEC 62443 certification satisfy CRA conformity assessment requirements?+

IEC 62443-4-2 certification at Security Level 2 or above covers significant ground that overlaps with CRA Annex I requirements and is strong supporting evidence in a CRA conformity assessment. However, it is not a complete substitute. IEC 62443 is not a harmonised standard under the CRA and gives no presumption of conformity. The conformity assessment under Article 32 must show conformity with all Annex I requirements, including the CVD policy () and the SBOM (). A harmonised standard gives a presumption of conformity only after its reference is published in the Official Journal (Article 27(1)).

How do we handle vulnerabilities in third-party protocol stacks (e.g., EtherNet/IP, PROFINET)?+

Third-party protocol stacks included in your product are your responsibility under the CRA. If a vulnerability is discovered in an embedded EtherNet/IP or PROFINET stack used in your product, you are required to assess the impact on your product, communicate with the upstream component supplier to obtain a patch, and issue a security update to your customers within a reasonable timeframe. Your SBOM must identify all protocol stack components and their versions. Upstream supplier contracts should include provisions requiring timely security notification and patch delivery.

Guides for related sectors

Robotics & Collaborative Robot ManufacturersRobotics and collaborative robot (cobot) manufacturers placing industrial robots, autonomous mobile robots (AMRs), and cobot platforms on the EU market must address CRA obligations alongside existing Machinery Regulation requirements. Most robots, AMRs and cobot platforms are default-class products under the CRA, because Annex III lists no robot or machinery category and classification follows a product's core functionality (Article 7(1)).Chemical & Process Plant Automation VendorsChemical and process plant automation vendors supply distributed control systems (DCS), safety instrumented systems (SIS), and process SCADA platforms to EU chemical manufacturers. Annex III lists no DCS, SIS or SCADA category, so these products are default class under the CRA (Article 7(1)). Automation system failure in chemical production can have catastrophic consequences, and the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment must address them. The intersection of CRA cybersecurity requirements with Seveso III Directive major accident prevention obligations creates a complex dual regulatory framework. CRA compliance for chemical automation vendors is not only a market access requirement but a fundamental component of major hazard risk management.Facilities Management & CAFM System VendorsVendors of computer-aided facilities management (CAFM) software, integrated workplace management systems (IWMS), and IoT-connected building maintenance platforms sold to EU customers are manufacturers of products with digital elements under the CRA. CAFM systems increasingly integrate with building management systems, access control, energy management, and workplace sensor networks - creating complex connected architectures that must be secured under Annex I. Vendors must have incident notification capabilities in place for 11 September 2026, when Article 14 applies, and CVD programmes in place for 11 December 2027.Food & Beverage Automation System VendorsFood and beverage automation vendors supplying SCADA systems, batch controllers, filling line automation, and quality control inspection systems to EU food manufacturers must comply with the CRA as manufacturers of products with digital elements. The food industry's increasing connectivity - driven by Industry 4.0 adoption and supply chain traceability requirements - significantly expands the attack surface that must be addressed under Annex I. Ransomware attacks on food processing plants have demonstrated the severe operational consequences of inadequate OT security.

This industry guide is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.

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