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Industrial & ManufacturingCRA Guide

EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide for Food & Beverage Automation System Vendors

Default class for most products, including PLCs, SCADA, batch and filling line controllers. Important Class I for an industrial router, modem or switch (Annex III, point 12)

Food and beverage automation vendors supplying SCADA systems, batch controllers, filling line automation, and quality control inspection systems to EU food manufacturers must comply with the CRA as manufacturers of products with digital elements. The food industry's increasing connectivity - driven by Industry 4.0 adoption and supply chain traceability requirements - significantly expands the attack surface that must be addressed under Annex I. Ransomware attacks on food processing plants have demonstrated the severe operational consequences of inadequate OT security.

Article 13Article 14Annex IArticle 13Article 17Article 3
Deadline: 11 December 2027Classification: Default class for most products, including PLCs, SCADA, batch and filling line controllers. Important Class I for an industrial router, modem or switch (Annex III, point 12)

Last updated 26 October 2026

CRA Scope and Classification for Food Automation

Automation products sold to EU food and beverage manufacturers - including PLC-based filling line controllers, SCADA systems for process monitoring, clean-in-place (CIP) automation systems, quality control vision inspection systems, cold chain monitoring platforms, and traceability and serialisation systems - are products with digital elements under Article 3(1). Classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)). Annex III lists no process automation, PLC or SCADA category, so most food and beverage automation products are default class. Control of food safety parameters, such as pasteurisation temperature, allergen separation and packaging seal integrity, does not change the class. It raises the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment has to address. An industrial router, a modem for connection to the internet or a switch is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12). Vendors should note that the food sector's NIS2 classification as critical infrastructure (under the 'Food' sector) means that food manufacturing operators themselves have cybersecurity obligations that will drive upstream procurement requirements for CRA-compliant automation products.

CRA reference:Article 3(1), Article 7(1), Article 13(2), Annex III

Technical Security Obligations for Food Industry OT

Food and beverage automation systems face the same OT security challenges as other industrial sectors, with additional complexity from food-specific requirements including HACCP documentation, traceability record integrity, and allergen management controls. Annex I obligations include: implementing authenticated access controls for all SCADA and HMI interfaces, including local operator terminals; encrypting communications between field devices and supervisory systems where protocol support permits; ensuring firmware and software updates are authenticated and can be applied without disrupting production lines during planned maintenance windows; providing tamper-evident audit logs for all recipe changes, setpoint modifications, and batch parameter adjustments; and eliminating default shared credentials on all networked automation components. The SBOM must cover all software components in the supplied system, including PLC runtime environments, SCADA server software, historian databases, and any third-party process optimisation modules.

CRA reference:Annex I Parts I and II

CVD Policy Under Article 13

Article 13 requires a published CVD policy with a dedicated security reporting channel. For food and beverage automation vendors, the CVD programme must accommodate the operational realities of food production environments: patch deployment may be constrained by production schedules, regulatory requirements for process validation, and the need to avoid disruption to continuous-production facilities. The CVD policy should specify: a dedicated security contact and response timeline; how vulnerability information is communicated to food manufacturer customers with context appropriate for production planning; the process for issuing interim mitigations for vulnerabilities that cannot be patched immediately without production disruption; and how the vendor coordinates with ICS security researchers and relevant food safety authorities for vulnerabilities with food safety implications. Vendor-customer communication on security advisories should be integrated into existing maintenance and support channels.

CRA reference: and , Article 13(7)

Article 14 Incident Reporting for Food Manufacturing Automation

When a vulnerability in food automation systems is actively exploited, Article 14 requires notification to the relevant national CSIRT within 24 hours. For food and beverage vendors, exploitation scenarios range from ransomware attacks disrupting production to targeted manipulation of quality control or allergen management systems. The latter category - attacks that could affect food safety - may require notification to food safety authorities alongside regulatory cybersecurity notification. Vendors must have incident response procedures that can identify the scope of exploitation across the customer base rapidly and generate regulatory notifications within the 24-hour window. Large food manufacturers running mission-critical production equipment will expect direct, rapid notification from the vendor - post-incident communication protocols should be established with key accounts before an incident occurs.

CRA reference:Article 14(1), Article 14(2)

Conformity Assessment Pathway

Most food and beverage automation products are default class and can use Module A internal control (Article 32(1)). IEC 62443-4-1 (secure development lifecycle for industrial automation) and IEC 62443-4-2 (technical security requirements for industrial automation components) are the most directly applicable references. They are not harmonised standards under the CRA and give no presumption of conformity. Module A requires a complete technical file. It includes the system security architecture and threat model, the SBOM in machine-readable format, evidence of security testing (vulnerability scanning, penetration testing for externally accessible interfaces), the CVD policy documentation and the EU declaration of conformity. A router, modem or switch is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12). It can use Module A only when the manufacturer fully applies a harmonised standard, a common specification or a European cybersecurity certification scheme at assurance level at least substantial (Article 32(2)). No CRA harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal yet, so today such a product needs a notified body (Module B plus Module C, or Module H). Given that many food automation vendors are mid-size engineering companies, early investment in a structured secure development lifecycle - rather than attempting to retrofit security documentation - is the most cost-effective compliance path.

CRA reference:Article 28, Article 32, Annex VIII

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Frequently asked

Our filling line automation uses proprietary machine protocols with no encryption support. Are we required to change the protocol?+

The CRA requires security measures proportionate to the risk - it does not mandate specific protocols or cryptographic standards by name. Where proprietary protocols cannot support encryption, Annex I requires compensating controls: physical access controls for equipment, network segmentation isolating machine protocols from general IT networks, encrypted gateway devices at the boundary between machine networks and supervisory systems, and documented security guidance for customers on network architecture. These compensating controls must be documented in the technical file with a risk assessment demonstrating that the overall security level is appropriate. Protocol replacement, if feasible in future product generations, is the preferred long-term approach.

Our automation software manages allergen changeover procedures. How does a potential security vulnerability in this system interact with food safety regulations?+

A vulnerability in allergen management software that could allow unauthorised modification of changeover procedures represents a food safety risk as well as a cybersecurity risk. Under the CRA, you have obligation to report active exploitation within 24 hours. Under EU food law, your customers (food business operators) have HACCP obligations that assume their control systems function correctly - a security compromise undermining allergen controls could expose them to food safety authority investigation. Your CVD policy and incident response plan should address this dual-regulatory scenario, ensuring that when such vulnerabilities are identified, both cybersecurity and food safety notification pathways are activated. Proactive communication with major customers about this scenario before an incident is strongly advisable.

We supply automation software updates through an on-site service engineer visit. How does this interact with the CRA update obligation?+

The CRA requires security updates to be made available without undue delay - it does not specify the delivery mechanism. Engineer-delivered updates are acceptable, but the scheduling of engineer visits must be responsive to security severity: critical security patches cannot wait 6–12 months for the next planned maintenance visit. Vendors should establish an emergency patch deployment process for critical vulnerabilities that provides customers with: a rapid-response service visit option for highest-severity patches; or a documented interim mitigation package that customers can apply independently pending the next engineer visit. Update availability dates must be communicated to customers regardless of when they can be installed.

Guides for related sectors

HVAC & Climate Control ManufacturersHVAC and climate control manufacturers placing networked heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration systems on the EU market must comply with the EU Cyber Resilience Act. Article 14 incident reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the remaining obligations apply from 11 December 2027. Connected HVAC controllers, building management system (BMS) integration gateways, and smart thermostats are products with digital elements. Most HVAC products, including smart thermostats and commercial HVAC controllers with BMS integration, are default class, because Annex III lists no HVAC or building automation category. A gateway whose core functionality is a router or a modem for connection to the internet is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12).Industrial Automation & PLC VendorsIndustrial automation vendors placing programmable logic controllers, SCADA components, industrial gateways, and HMI systems on the EU market must comply with the EU Cyber Resilience Act. Article 14 incident reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the remaining obligations apply from 11 December 2027. Most OT products, including PLCs, DCS, SCADA and HMI, are default class, because Annex III lists no industrial control category. An industrial router, modem or switch is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12). The CRA introduces mandatory CVD policies and incident reporting obligations that many OT vendors currently lack entirely.Robotics & Collaborative Robot ManufacturersRobotics and collaborative robot (cobot) manufacturers placing industrial robots, autonomous mobile robots (AMRs), and cobot platforms on the EU market must address CRA obligations alongside existing Machinery Regulation requirements. Most robots, AMRs and cobot platforms are default-class products under the CRA, because Annex III lists no robot or machinery category and classification follows a product's core functionality (Article 7(1)).Chemical & Process Plant Automation VendorsChemical and process plant automation vendors supply distributed control systems (DCS), safety instrumented systems (SIS), and process SCADA platforms to EU chemical manufacturers. Annex III lists no DCS, SIS or SCADA category, so these products are default class under the CRA (Article 7(1)). Automation system failure in chemical production can have catastrophic consequences, and the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment must address them. The intersection of CRA cybersecurity requirements with Seveso III Directive major accident prevention obligations creates a complex dual regulatory framework. CRA compliance for chemical automation vendors is not only a market access requirement but a fundamental component of major hazard risk management.

This industry guide is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.

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