EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide for Cybersecurity Product Vendors
Important Class II for firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems. Important Class I for VPN products, SIEM systems, anti-malware software, identity and privileged access management, password managers and PKI software. Default class for tools whose core functionality matches no Annex III category, such as most vulnerability scanners
Cybersecurity product vendors manufacture firewalls, intrusion detection systems, endpoint security platforms, SIEM appliances, and identity management products. Firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems are Important Class II under the CRA (Annex III, Class II, point 2). SIEM systems, VPN products, anti-malware software and identity management products are Important Class I (Annex III, points 7, 5, 4 and 1). Security products are among the most closely scrutinised product categories given that vulnerabilities in defensive tools directly enable attacker access to protected environments. CRA compliance is therefore both a regulatory obligation and a market credibility requirement.
Last updated 26 October 2026
CRA Scope and Classification for Security Products
- Firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, including web application firewalls and host-based IDS (Class II, point 2)
- Identity management systems and privileged access management software and hardware (Class I, point 1)
- Password managers (Class I, point 3)
- Software that searches for, removes or quarantines malicious software (Class I, point 4)
- Products with the function of virtual private network (VPN), including VPN clients, servers and gateways (Class I, point 5)
- Network management systems (Class I, point 6)
- SIEM systems (Class I, point 7)
- Public key infrastructure and digital certificate issuance software (Class I, point 9)
An EDR platform is Class I when its core functionality is to search for, remove or quarantine malicious software (point 4). It is Class II when its core functionality is host-based intrusion detection or prevention (point 2). A vulnerability management platform matches no listed category and is default class. A SOAR product can do what a SIEM does, but its core functionality is different, so it is generally outside the SIEM category.
The customer sector, critical infrastructure deployment and use by managed security service providers do not change the class. They raise the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment has to address. A consumer antivirus product and a SIEM platform in national critical infrastructure are both Important Class I (points 4 and 7). Vendors must assess each product line independently and document the classification rationale. The class has significant conformity assessment implications.
Annex I Security Requirements for Cybersecurity Products
The CRA's requirement that cybersecurity products themselves be secure is the most pointed form of regulatory accountability this sector faces. Annex I Part I obligations applied to security products include:
- No unnecessary attack surface: A firewall or EDR agent must not introduce new vulnerabilities through its own management interfaces, update channels, or agent communications.
- Authenticated update mechanisms: Security product updates - including threat intelligence feed updates and signature databases - must be cryptographically authenticated.
- Secure management interfaces: All remote management APIs must require strong authentication and use current TLS configurations.
- Least privilege: Security agents running with elevated privileges (kernel-level EDR agents, network capture components) must be designed with least privilege and documented process isolation.
- SBOM maintenance: Given that security products often embed extensive open-source libraries and third-party components, SBOM maintenance is both a CRA obligation and a practical necessity for managing exposure to upstream vulnerabilities like those affecting log4j or OpenSSL.
Security product vendors who have experienced significant incidents from their own product vulnerabilities (e.g., exploitation of management interfaces) face reputational and legal risk that makes CRA compliance an existential priority.
CVD Policy and Article 13 - A Higher Standard
Security product vendors are expected to operate CVD programmes that are exemplary by industry standards. Article 13 formalises this expectation into a legal obligation, but the reputational stakes for security vendors make non-compliance particularly damaging.
- Be publicly accessible and cover all products with digital elements
- Not require NDAs for initial vulnerability reports (a practice some vendors have used historically)
- Define clear, reasonable acknowledgement timelines and embargo periods
- Include a commitment to CVE assignment and public advisory publication
Security vendors should go beyond the Article 13 minimum and publish advisories in CSAF 2.0 format with VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) statements, enabling automated downstream assessment by their customers' vulnerability management tools. Customers who deploy security products in regulated environments will increasingly require CSAF/VEX data as a condition of procurement. CVD Portal generates CSAF 2.0 records and VEX statements for each resolved vulnerability.
Article 14 Incident Reporting for Security Products
Actively exploited vulnerabilities in security products are among the most consequential cybersecurity events, as they directly compromise the protection of the vendors' customers. ENISA and national CSIRTs will treat Article 14 reports from security product vendors with the highest urgency.
- 24-hour early warning: Triggered immediately upon confirmation of active exploitation, including any available information about the exploit methodology.
- Simultaneous customer communication: The 24-hour early warning should be accompanied by direct customer notification, particularly where customer systems are at immediate risk.
- 72-hour vulnerability notification: Full vulnerability details, affected versions, available mitigations, and patch timeline.
- Final report, no later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available (Article 14(2)(c)): Confirmation of patch availability, evidence of deployment, and post-incident analysis.
Security vendors should also consider coordinating with national CSIRTs, ENISA and, where EU institutions are affected, CERT-EU to support incident response for affected customers in parallel with the formal reporting process.
Conformity Assessment for Security Products
An Important Class I security product can use Module A self-assessment only when the manufacturer fully applies a harmonised standard, a common specification or a European cybersecurity certification scheme at assurance level substantial or higher (Article 32(2)). No CRA harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal yet, so today a Class I product needs a notified body, for EU-type examination (Module B plus Module C) or full quality assurance (Module H). An Important Class II product, such as a firewall or an IDS, always needs one of those notified body procedures or a European cybersecurity certification scheme specified under Article 27(9) at assurance level substantial or higher, for the requirements it covers (Article 32(3)). Module A is never open to it. A default-class product can use Module A (Article 32(1)). The Annex I essential requirements are the same for every class.
Cybersecurity vendors should leverage existing security certifications - Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) evaluations, FIPS 140-3 certifications, and cloud security certifications like CSA STAR - as supporting evidence in CRA assessments. Common Criteria Protection Profiles that align with CRA Annex I requirements may eventually be recognised as providing presumption of conformity, though the harmonised standards process is not yet complete.
Vendors should budget 12–18 months for Class II assessment processes and begin notified body engagement immediately if they have not already done so. Class II assessment capacity across European notified bodies is extremely limited.
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Frequently asked
Are vulnerability scanners and penetration testing tools subject to the CRA?+
Yes, if they are commercial products with digital elements placed on the EU market. Vulnerability scanners, penetration testing frameworks distributed as commercial products, and security assessment appliances are within CRA scope. Classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)), and deployment context does not change it. Annex III lists no vulnerability scanner or penetration testing category, so most of these tools are default class. A tool whose core functionality is a listed category, such as an intrusion detection system (Class II, point 2), takes that class. Open-source tools distributed for free without commercial support or warranty may fall under the CRA's open-source exception, but commercially supported distributions of open-source security tools are likely within scope.
How do we manage the conflict between responsible disclosure and our customers' need for immediate patches?+
The CRA's CVD framework does not require immediate public disclosure. Article 13's coordinated vulnerability disclosure process allows for an embargo period during which you develop and deploy a patch before public disclosure. The obligation to notify ENISA under Article 14 applies to active exploitation, not to the mere discovery of a vulnerability. If a researcher reports a vulnerability that is not yet exploited, you can follow your standard responsible disclosure process - acknowledging, developing a fix, coordinating disclosure timing - without triggering Article 14. Customers at immediate risk should be notified under your standard customer security advisory process.
Does CRA compliance require publishing source code or full technical details of security products?+
No. The CRA does not require publication of source code or detailed technical architecture information that could be used to attack the product. The technical file - which contains detailed security architecture documentation - is held by the manufacturer and made available to market surveillance authorities on request, not published publicly. What must be public is the CVD policy (Article 13) and security advisories for resolved vulnerabilities. Advisory content should include enough information for customers to assess risk and prioritise patching, but need not include exploit code or vulnerability root cause details that could assist attackers.
Compliance checklists for your products
Key CRA articles for Cybersecurity Product Vendors
Guides for related sectors
Free CRA tools
This industry guide is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.
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