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Industrial & ManufacturingCRA Guide

EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide for Chemical & Process Plant Automation Vendors

Default class for DCS, SIS, ESD, SCADA and historian products. Important Class I for an industrial switch or router (Annex III, point 12). Important Class II for an industrial firewall or intrusion detection system (Annex III, Class II, point 2)

Chemical and process plant automation vendors supply distributed control systems (DCS), safety instrumented systems (SIS), and process SCADA platforms to EU chemical manufacturers. Annex III lists no DCS, SIS or SCADA category, so these products are default class under the CRA (Article 7(1)). Automation system failure in chemical production can have catastrophic consequences, and the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment must address them. The intersection of CRA cybersecurity requirements with Seveso III Directive major accident prevention obligations creates a complex dual regulatory framework. CRA compliance for chemical automation vendors is not only a market access requirement but a fundamental component of major hazard risk management.

Article 13Article 14Annex IAnnex IIIArticle 13Article 17Article 6
Deadline: 11 December 2027Classification: Default class for DCS, SIS, ESD, SCADA and historian products. Important Class I for an industrial switch or router (Annex III, point 12). Important Class II for an industrial firewall or intrusion detection system (Annex III, Class II, point 2)

Last updated 26 October 2026

CRA Scope and Seveso III Interaction

Automation products supplied to EU chemical manufacturers - including distributed control systems (DCS), safety instrumented systems (SIS), emergency shutdown systems (ESD), process SCADA platforms, and process historian systems - are products with digital elements under Article 3(1). For products deployed at Seveso III upper-tier sites, the risk profile is exceptional: a cyberattack causing loss of process control could trigger chemical releases with major accident consequences. Classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)). Annex III lists no DCS, SIS, ESD or SCADA category, so these products are default class. Their role in process control and safety functions raises the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment has to address. It does not change the class. A network switch or router supplied with the system is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12). An industrial firewall or intrusion detection system is Important Class II (Annex III, Class II, point 2). The Seveso III Directive requires major hazard operators to include malicious acts in their major hazard analysis - CRA-compliant automation equipment provides a documented security baseline that supports this requirement. Vendors must record the classification of each product. A controller that can serve as either a DCS component or a SIS component is default class in both roles.

CRA reference:Article 3(1), Article 7(1), Article 13(2), Annex III

Technical Security for Chemical Process Control Systems

Chemical process automation systems present the most demanding security engineering challenge in the OT sector: security failures can have immediate life safety and environmental consequences. Annex I requirements include: segregating SIS (safety) networks from DCS (process control) networks with no direct IP connectivity between them; implementing authenticated access for all engineering workstation connections to DCS controllers; ensuring firmware updates to field controllers are authenticated and integrity-verified, and can be applied without bypassing safety shutdowns; providing tamper-evident audit logs for all setpoint changes, configuration modifications, and alarm acknowledgments; eliminating shared engineering workstation credentials; and implementing remote access security for vendor support connections equivalent to on-site access. The SBOM must cover DCS controller firmware, engineering workstation software, historian server components, and any third-party process optimisation or simulation modules integrated with the control system.

CRA reference:Annex I Parts I and II

CVD Policy for Chemical Automation Vendors

Article 13 requires a published CVD policy. Chemical automation vendors operate in a sector where security vulnerabilities can have catastrophic consequences, and the CVD programme must reflect this risk. The policy must: establish accelerated response timelines for vulnerabilities affecting SIS or ESD systems; specify coordination procedures with the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), national major hazard competent authorities (e.g. HSE in the UK context, national Seveso authorities in EU member states), and relevant ICS security organisations including ICS-CERT national equivalents; and define how security advisories are communicated to major hazard site operators with appropriate urgency. For vulnerabilities affecting safety-critical functions, interim mitigations - isolation of affected components, implementation of manual backup procedures, enhanced safety monitoring - must be specified in security advisories alongside the patch. Chemical sector customers require highly detailed security advisories to support their own major hazard risk assessments.

CRA reference: and , Article 13(7)

Article 14 Reporting: Major Hazard Implications

Article 14 requires CSIRT notification within 24 hours of confirmed active exploitation. For chemical automation vendors, exploitation of a DCS or SIS system is a major hazard event that triggers simultaneous notifications to: the relevant national CSIRT (Article 14); the relevant major hazard national competent authority (Seveso III); and potentially ECHA and cross-border affected authorities for Seveso upper-tier sites near national borders. A confirmed cyberattack on a major chemical site's control systems may trigger activation of national emergency response plans. Vendors must have pre-established communication protocols for this scenario, with authorised personnel identified and contact lists maintained for relevant national authorities across EU member states where products are deployed. The 24-hour CSIRT notification must communicate the potential for major hazard consequences to enable appropriate response coordination.

CRA reference:Article 14(1), Article 14(2), Article 14(3)

Conformity Assessment for Safety-Critical Process Control

A default-class DCS, SIS or SCADA product can use Module A self-assessment (Article 32(1)). The manufacturer can also choose a notified body, for EU-type examination (Module B plus Module C) or full quality assurance (Module H). An Important Class II product, such as an industrial firewall, always needs one of those notified body procedures or a European cybersecurity certification scheme specified under Article 27(9) at assurance level substantial or higher, for the requirements it covers (Article 32(3)). Where a notified body is used, the major hazard context makes IEC 62443 and IEC 61511 (functional safety for process industry) expertise valuable. The CRA technical file for chemical automation must include a security case that explicitly addresses the interaction between security controls and the functional safety case - demonstrating that security measures do not introduce common cause failures into the SIS, and that the SIS retains its protective function under cyberattack scenarios. This is the most technically demanding aspect of CRA conformity for this sector. IEC 62443-3-3 (system security requirements) and IEC 62443-4-2 (component security requirements) provide the most directly applicable security standards framework. Vendors with existing IEC 61511 certification will find the safety case methodology familiar but must extend it explicitly to address cybersecurity threats.

CRA reference:Article 32, Annex VIII

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Frequently asked

Our SIS is certified to IEC 61511 SIL 3. Does this functional safety certification address CRA requirements?+

IEC 61511 SIL 3 certification addresses functional safety - the ability of the SIS to perform its protective function on demand. It does not address cybersecurity requirements such as authentication, encryption, vulnerability management, or CVD policy. These are distinct and additive requirements under the CRA. However, the systematic development and documentation approach required for SIL 3 certification - hazard analysis, architecture documentation, design reviews, testing - provides an excellent foundation for the CRA technical file. A gap analysis comparing your existing SIL 3 documentation against Annex I requirements will identify the specific cybersecurity additions needed. IEC 62443-3-3 Security Level requirements should be aligned with your SIL classification in the cybersecurity-safety integration analysis.

We manufacture both the DCS and the SIS for the same process line. How do we address the security segregation requirement when both systems are ours?+

Annex I requires segregation of safety functions from process control functions as a fundamental security principle - this applies even when both systems are supplied by the same vendor. Your DCS and SIS must be architected with a security boundary that prevents an attacker who compromises the DCS from accessing or manipulating the SIS. This means: separate engineering workstation access for DCS and SIS configuration; no direct IP connectivity between DCS and SIS networks; unidirectional data diodes or read-only interfaces where status data from the SIS must be visible in the DCS; and separate authentication systems. The technical file must demonstrate this segregation and include a security architecture review confirming that DCS compromise cannot propagate to SIS function.

How does the CRA affect our legacy DCS products still running at Seveso sites where replacement is not feasible?+

The CRA requirements apply to products placed on the market from 11 December 2027. A product placed on the market before that date is subject to them only if it is substantially modified from that date (Article 69(2)). Article 14 reporting applies from 11 September 2026 to all in-scope products, including products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 (Article 69(3)). A substantial modification or a new product variant placed on the market from 11 December 2027 triggers the full compliance obligations. For legacy products that will remain in service with no new market placements, your CRA obligation is Article 14 reporting. Other support is what is contractually agreed with the site operator. That said, Seveso site operators' major hazard analysis obligations require them to manage cybersecurity risks in legacy control systems - you should provide customers with security hardening guidance and technical support even for legacy products, both as a safety obligation and as a customer retention matter.

Guides for related sectors

Facilities Management & CAFM System VendorsVendors of computer-aided facilities management (CAFM) software, integrated workplace management systems (IWMS), and IoT-connected building maintenance platforms sold to EU customers are manufacturers of products with digital elements under the CRA. CAFM systems increasingly integrate with building management systems, access control, energy management, and workplace sensor networks - creating complex connected architectures that must be secured under Annex I. Vendors must have incident notification capabilities in place for 11 September 2026, when Article 14 applies, and CVD programmes in place for 11 December 2027.Food & Beverage Automation System VendorsFood and beverage automation vendors supplying SCADA systems, batch controllers, filling line automation, and quality control inspection systems to EU food manufacturers must comply with the CRA as manufacturers of products with digital elements. The food industry's increasing connectivity - driven by Industry 4.0 adoption and supply chain traceability requirements - significantly expands the attack surface that must be addressed under Annex I. Ransomware attacks on food processing plants have demonstrated the severe operational consequences of inadequate OT security.HVAC & Climate Control ManufacturersHVAC and climate control manufacturers placing networked heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration systems on the EU market must comply with the EU Cyber Resilience Act. Article 14 incident reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the remaining obligations apply from 11 December 2027. Connected HVAC controllers, building management system (BMS) integration gateways, and smart thermostats are products with digital elements. Most HVAC products, including smart thermostats and commercial HVAC controllers with BMS integration, are default class, because Annex III lists no HVAC or building automation category. A gateway whose core functionality is a router or a modem for connection to the internet is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12).Industrial Automation & PLC VendorsIndustrial automation vendors placing programmable logic controllers, SCADA components, industrial gateways, and HMI systems on the EU market must comply with the EU Cyber Resilience Act. Article 14 incident reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the remaining obligations apply from 11 December 2027. Most OT products, including PLCs, DCS, SCADA and HMI, are default class, because Annex III lists no industrial control category. An industrial router, modem or switch is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12). The CRA introduces mandatory CVD policies and incident reporting obligations that many OT vendors currently lack entirely.

This industry guide is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.

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