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Aerospace & DefenceCRA Guide

EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide for Avionics & Aerospace Systems Manufacturers

Excluded for products certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (Article 2(3)) and for products developed exclusively for defence (Article 2(7)). In-scope products, such as uncertified ground support and maintenance software, are default class unless their core functionality matches an Annex III or Annex IV category

Avionics and aerospace systems manufacturers that sell products to EU civil aviation operators must check CRA scope product by product. The CRA does not apply to products certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (Article 2(3)), or to products developed or modified exclusively for national security or defence purposes (Article 2(7)). Ground support, maintenance and flight data monitoring software that is not certified under Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 is in scope. Annex III lists no avionics category, so an in-scope product is default class unless its core functionality matches a listed category. Manufacturers must determine scope carefully and establish CVD and incident reporting capabilities that complement EASA's safety reporting framework.

Article 13Article 14Annex IAnnex IIIArticle 13Article 3
Deadline: 11 December 2027Classification: Excluded for products certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (Article 2(3)) and for products developed exclusively for defence (Article 2(7)). In-scope products, such as uncertified ground support and maintenance software, are default class unless their core functionality matches an Annex III or Annex IV category

Last updated 26 October 2026

CRA Scope: Civil Avionics vs. Defence Exclusion

The CRA does not apply to products developed or modified exclusively for national security or defence purposes (Article 2(7)). Manufacturers of purely military avionics systems are therefore outside CRA scope. The CRA also does not apply to products certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (Article 2(3)). Flight management systems, aircraft communication addressing and reporting system (ACARS) equipment, avionics networking equipment and other airborne equipment that is certified under that Regulation are therefore outside the CRA. Dual-use and civil products that are not certified under Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 are in scope. This can include electronic flight bags (EFBs), ground-based maintenance software, and flight data monitoring systems sold commercially. Manufacturers of both military and civil product lines must carefully assess which of their products are exclusively for defence use and document this exclusion clearly. Products sold commercially through distribution channels with possible dual-use cannot claim the defence exclusion.

Annex III lists no avionics category, so an in-scope product is default class unless its core functionality matches a listed category (Article 7(1)). Safety criticality does not change the class. It raises the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment has to address. A ground network router or switch is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12).

CRA reference:Article 2(3), Article 2(7), Article 3(1), Article 7(1), Article 13(2)

Technical Security Obligations Under Annex I

For commercially distributed avionics and aerospace software, Annex I imposes security-by-design obligations that must be reconciled with existing DO-326A and DO-356A airworthiness security processes. Required measures include: implementing access controls that prevent unauthorised modification of safety-critical parameters; ensuring software update mechanisms are authenticated and integrity-verified, consistent with DO-326A security risk assessment requirements; maintaining comprehensive SBOMs for all software components, including DO-178C-certified flight software; providing secure default configurations with documented hardening guidance; and implementing audit logging for all security-relevant operations in ground-based maintenance systems. For embedded avionics products, first check whether the product is certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. A certified product is outside the CRA (Article 2(3)).

CRA reference:Annex I Parts I and II

CVD Policy Under Article 13 for Aerospace Manufacturers

Article 13 requires aerospace manufacturers to publish a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy for commercially distributed products in scope. The aerospace sector has well-established safety reporting mechanisms - Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) under EU 376/2014 - but these address safety events rather than cybersecurity vulnerability reports. A dedicated CVD policy must exist alongside safety reporting, handling security researcher reports, penetration test findings, and third-party vulnerability intelligence. The CVD policy must specify: a dedicated security reporting contact separate from safety reporting channels; acknowledgment and response timelines; and a process for coordinating with EASA and ENISA where a security vulnerability has potential safety implications. Manufacturers should document the interaction between CVD and safety reporting processes to ensure vulnerabilities with dual safety/security relevance are handled through both channels.

CRA reference: and , Article 13(7)

Article 14 Notification and Interaction with EASA Safety Reporting

Article 14 requires notification to the relevant national CSIRT within 24 hours of confirmed active exploitation. For avionics products, active exploitation of a cybersecurity vulnerability may simultaneously trigger EASA safety reporting obligations if the exploitation could affect airworthiness. Manufacturers must establish incident response procedures that coordinate between cybersecurity teams and safety/airworthiness teams, ensuring that the 24-hour CSIRT notification and any concurrent EASA occurrence report are consistent and mutually referenced. Pre-established relationships with EASA's cybersecurity team and national aviation authority cybersecurity contacts will facilitate rapid multi-channel notification. The Article 14 final report should document the safety assessment performed alongside the cybersecurity impact analysis.

CRA reference:Article 14(1), Article 14(2), Article 14(3)

Conformity Assessment Pathway

Safety-critical airborne products certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 are outside the CRA (Article 2(3)). Ground support software, maintenance information systems, and flight data monitoring platforms are default class unless their core functionality matches an Annex III category. A default-class product can use Module A self-assessment (Article 32(1)). An Important Class I product, such as a ground network router, can use Module A only when the manufacturer fully applies a harmonised standard, a common specification or a European cybersecurity certification scheme at assurance level substantial or higher (Article 32(2)). No CRA harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal yet, so today a Class I product needs a notified body. Where a notified body is used, manufacturers should check that it has aerospace domain expertise, because the assessment needs assessors who understand both regulatory frameworks. The CRA technical file must include a cybersecurity risk assessment that cross-references the DO-326A airworthiness security process and IASAS (Information Assurance Security Assessment) documentation where applicable. This cross-referencing approach leverages existing EASA compliance documentation to reduce duplicated effort.

CRA reference:Article 2(3), Article 32, Annex VIII

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Frequently asked

Our products are certified to DO-326A. Does this satisfy the CRA's security requirements?+

An airborne product certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 is outside the CRA (Article 2(3)), so this question applies only to in-scope products. DO-326A provides an airworthiness security process framework that addresses many of the same principles as the CRA's Annex I requirements - threat analysis, security architecture, security testing. However, DO-326A certification does not constitute CRA conformity assessment and cannot substitute for CE marking obligations. The two frameworks are complementary: DO-326A documentation provides strong evidence for the CRA technical file, and manufacturers can leverage existing airworthiness security documentation to streamline CRA compliance. A gap analysis against Annex I requirements - particularly SBOM obligations, CVD policy, and Article 14 notification procedures - will identify what additional work is needed.

How do we handle the SBOM requirement for DO-178C-certified flight software where source code disclosure is controlled?+

Flight software that is certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, as part of an aircraft or airborne equipment, is outside the CRA (Article 2(3)). For in-scope software, the CRA's SBOM obligation requires a machine-readable inventory of components - it does not require public disclosure of the SBOM itself. Your SBOM must be maintained internally and made available to market surveillance authorities on request. Component-level information (package names, versions, and known vulnerabilities) is generally sufficient - detailed source code is not required. For proprietary components developed in-house, the SBOM should capture the component identity, version, and the internal vulnerability tracking reference. Established SBOM formats (SPDX, CycloneDX) support confidentiality designations and access controls.

Are Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) in CRA scope, and how are they classified?+

EFBs sold as commercial products to airlines or flight operations departments are in scope as products with digital elements, unless the EFB product is certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (Article 2(3)). Classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)), and EFB type, connectivity and integration depth do not change it. Annex III lists no EFB category, so in-scope EFB hardware and EFB applications are default class. Network connectivity, real-time data integration and interfaces to avionics systems raise the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment has to address. EFB application software sold through commercial distribution, including app stores for tablet-based EFBs, is also in scope. Vendors should conduct scope and classification analysis per EFB product variant.

This industry guide is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.

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