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Threat Actor

A threat actor is an entity - individual, group, or organisation - that poses a cybersecurity threat by intentionally or unintentionally conducting activities that can harm systems, data, or users. Understanding relevant threat actors is a required input to the risk assessments and threat models mandated by the CRA.

A threat actor is an entity - individual, group, or organisation - that poses a cybersecurity threat by intentionally or unintentionally conducting activities that can harm systems, data, or users. Understanding relevant threat actors is a required input to the risk assessments and threat models mandated by the CRA.

Product Security Engineering

Last updated 19 July 2026

What Is a Threat Actor?

A threat actor is any entity that intentionally or unintentionally causes harm to a system, organisation, or individual through cyber means. In security risk assessments, identifying relevant threat actors is a foundational step - the controls needed to defend against a nation-state attacker are very different from those needed against a curious teenager. Threat actors are typically characterised by: motivation (financial, political, ideological, competitive espionage, disruption); capability (skill level, access to zero-day exploits, resources); opportunity (access to the target, knowledge of its vulnerabilities); and typical tactics (phishing, supply chain attacks, physical access, insider threats). For manufacturers performing CRA risk assessments, the threat actor profile shapes which threats are credible and therefore which mitigations are proportionate.

CRA reference:Annex I

Threat Actor Categories Relevant to CRA Products

For CRA-covered products, the most relevant threat actor categories are:

  • Cybercriminal groups: Financially motivated actors using ransomware, credential theft, and botnet recruitment. IoT devices are prime targets for botnet recruitment (Mirai-style attacks). Industrial equipment may be targeted for ransomware extortion.
  • Nation-state attackers: State-sponsored groups with high capabilities and specific geopolitical objectives. Relevant for Important Class products in critical infrastructure sectors. Use advanced persistent threat (APT) techniques.
  • Industrial spies: Corporate espionage actors targeting intellectual property. Relevant for products in competitive industries where design data is valuable.
  • Script kiddies / opportunistic attackers: Low-capability actors using publicly available exploit tools against known vulnerabilities. These actors are the most common threat to consumer devices - they scan for unpatched, internet-exposed products at scale.
  • Insider threats: Malicious or negligent insiders with legitimate access to systems. Relevant to manufacturing security and supply chain integrity.
CRA reference:Annex I

Using Threat Actor Profiles in CRA Risk Assessments

CRA Annex I requires manufacturers to conduct a cybersecurity risk assessment. Threat actor profiles are an input to this assessment. The process:

  1. Identify credible threat actors: Based on the product category, sector, and geographic market, determine which threat actor types are likely to target the product. A consumer smart home device will primarily face opportunistic attackers; an industrial SCADA component may face nation-state actors.
  1. Map actor capabilities to attack vectors: For each relevant threat actor, identify the attack vectors they are likely to use given their capability level - automated vulnerability scanning, exploitation of published CVEs, supply chain compromise, or zero-day research.
  1. Assess impact scenarios: For each actor × attack vector combination, assess the potential impact on the product and its users.
  1. Design proportionate controls: Controls should be proportionate to the credibility and severity of the threats identified - over-engineering against implausible threats wastes resources.
CRA reference:Annex I

MITRE ATT&CK for Threat Actor Profiling

MITRE ATT&CK is a globally accessible, publicly available knowledge base of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) based on real-world observations. It provides structured threat actor profiles and technique libraries that manufacturers can use to ground their CRA threat models in observed attacker behaviour. For IoT and ICS products, MITRE ATT&CK for ICS and ATT&CK for Mobile provide sector-specific technique matrices. Using ATT&CK in threat modelling:

  • Map the product's attack surface to relevant ATT&CK techniques (Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, etc.).
  • Identify which techniques are plausible given the product's connectivity and deployment context.
  • Design detection and prevention controls targeting the highest-risk techniques.
  • Document the ATT&CK technique coverage in the Annex VII threat model to demonstrate a structured, evidence-based approach to risk assessment.

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Frequently asked

Does the CRA require manufacturers to document threat actors in their risk assessment?+

The CRA requires a cybersecurity risk assessment but does not prescribe a specific methodology or require explicit threat actor documentation. However, a meaningful risk assessment inherently requires considering who the threats come from. A risk assessment that only lists generic 'attacker' threats without considering actor capability and motivation is less useful for designing proportionate controls and may be challenged by a Notified Body or MSA as insufficiently rigorous. Documenting threat actor profiles explicitly demonstrates a structured approach that strengthens the conformity assessment case.

Should a small consumer device manufacturer be concerned about nation-state threats?+

In most cases, no - nation-state attackers focus their sophisticated capabilities on high-value targets (critical infrastructure, defence, government systems). A manufacturer of smart light bulbs or home routers faces primarily opportunistic cybercriminal threats. The CRA's principle of proportionality means that controls should match the credible threat. However, consumer IoT devices that aggregate large numbers of units are sometimes targeted by nation-state-linked actors to create infrastructure for future operations - botnet recruitment is not exclusively a criminal activity. Including a proportionate consideration of this scenario in the threat model is appropriate.

How do threat actors relate to CVSS scoring?+

CVSS base scores are calculated independently of threat actor context - they measure the theoretical maximum severity of a vulnerability in an idealised scenario. Threat actor profiling helps contextualise CVSS scores for a specific product's deployment. CVSS v4.0's threat metrics (specifically the Active Exploitation metric) start to bridge this gap. In practice, threat actor intelligence is used alongside CVSS scores in vulnerability prioritisation: a CVSS 7.0 vulnerability being actively targeted by a sophisticated actor relevant to the product's sector may warrant faster remediation than a CVSS 9.0 vulnerability with no known attacker interest.

Sector checklists covering Threat Actor

Industrial Controllers & PLCsIndustrial controllers, PLCs, and SCADA components are default-class products under the CRA, because classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)) and Annex III lists no industrial control category. They can use Module A internal control (Article 32(1)). These products have long operational lifetimes (10–20+ years), network connectivity, and significant safety implications. These facts raise the risk that the Article 13(2) risk assessment must address. Article 14 reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the conformity obligations apply from 11 December 2027.Enterprise Networking EquipmentEnterprise networking equipment - switches, firewalls, load balancers, and network management systems - spans multiple Annex III classifications. Firewalls in hardware or software form and intrusion detection and prevention systems are Important Class II. Switches, routers, wireless access points, network management systems and SIEM systems are Important Class I. A load balancer is default class unless its core functionality is a listed category, such as a web application firewall. Class II products always need third-party conformity assessment (Article 32(3)). Class I products need a notified body today, because no CRA harmonised standard is cited yet (Article 32(2)).Smart Grid & Energy InfrastructureSmart grid systems, including advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), distribution automation systems, grid management software, and grid-connected energy storage controllers, are products with digital elements in scope for the CRA. Classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)). Annex III lists no grid, metering or energy category, so most of these products are default class. A smart meter gateway within a smart metering system as defined in Directive (EU) 2019/944 is a critical product (Annex IV, point 2). Grid impact raises the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment must address. The energy sector is NIS2-classified as essential infrastructure, creating overlapping obligations between CRA product requirements and NIS2 operator obligations.Smart Home DevicesSmart home devices, such as thermostats, smart speakers, lighting controllers and home security cameras, are among the most common products with digital elements in scope for the CRA. Thermostats and lighting controllers are default class, and Module A internal control is open to them (Article 32(1)). A smart speaker with a general purpose virtual assistant is Important Class I (Annex III, point 16). A home security camera, smart lock, baby monitor or alarm system is Important Class I (Annex III, point 17). So is a hub or software that centrally controls these security products.

This definition is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.

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