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Incident Response & Operations

Indicator of Compromise (IoC)

An Indicator of Compromise (IoC) is a piece of forensic evidence - such as a malicious IP address, file hash, domain name, or registry key - that suggests a system has been compromised. IoCs are used in incident response and threat intelligence to detect and investigate security incidents, including the exploitation of product vulnerabilities.

An Indicator of Compromise (IoC) is a piece of forensic evidence - such as a malicious IP address, file hash, domain name, or registry key - that suggests a system has been compromised. IoCs are used in incident response and threat intelligence to detect and investigate security incidents, including the exploitation of product vulnerabilities.

Incident Response & Operations

Last updated 19 July 2026

What Is an Indicator of Compromise?

An Indicator of Compromise (IoC) is a technical artefact or observable that provides evidence of malicious activity or that a system has been compromised. IoCs are derived from incident analysis, threat intelligence research, and malware reverse engineering. Common IoC types include: file hashes (MD5, SHA-256) of known malicious files; IP addresses and domains associated with command-and-control infrastructure; URLs of malware distribution sites; registry keys created by malware; network traffic signatures; user agent strings used by exploit tools; and behavioural patterns such as unusual process spawning sequences. IoCs are shared between organisations via platforms like MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform), OpenCTI, and commercial threat intelligence feeds, enabling broad-based detection of known threats.

CRA reference:Article 14

IoCs in Detecting Exploitation of Product Vulnerabilities

For manufacturers subject to CRA Article 14, IoCs play a critical role in detecting whether a vulnerability in their product is being actively exploited - the trigger for the 24-hour notification obligation. Sources of product vulnerability IoCs:

  • Honeypot telemetry: Organisations like Shadowserver and GreyNoise operate honeypots that detect active exploitation attempts and share IoCs publicly.
  • CERT/CSIRT feeds: National CSIRTs share IoCs related to confirmed exploitation campaigns through member feeds and public advisories.
  • Commercial threat intelligence: Vendors such as Recorded Future, Mandiant, and CrowdStrike publish IoCs for known exploitation campaigns.
  • Researcher disclosure: Security researchers often share IoCs (e.g., proof-of-concept exploit hashes, attacker infrastructure) when disclosing vulnerabilities.

Manufacturers should monitor these sources for IoCs related to their product technology stack to minimise time-to-detection for active exploitation.

CRA reference:Article 14

The IoC Lifecycle: Detection to Response

IoCs have a defined lifecycle in incident detection and response:

  1. Collection: IoCs are gathered from threat intelligence sources, incident analysis, and community sharing platforms.
  2. Ingestion: IoCs are ingested into the SIEM or threat intelligence platform, where they are matched against logs and telemetry.
  3. Detection: When a match is found (e.g., a log entry contains a known-malicious IP address), an alert is generated.
  4. Investigation: SOC analysts investigate the alert to confirm whether a genuine incident has occurred or whether it is a false positive.
  5. Triage and escalation: Confirmed incidents involving product vulnerability exploitation are escalated to the PSIRT, which assesses whether a CRA Article 14 notification is required.
  6. Response: Containment and remediation actions are taken; ENISA notification is submitted within 24 hours if active exploitation is confirmed.
  7. IoC sharing: After the incident, new IoCs identified during investigation are shared with the threat intelligence community to benefit others.

IoC Limitations and the MITRE ATT&CK Approach

IoCs have important limitations: they represent known attacker infrastructure and tools. Sophisticated attackers regularly change IP addresses, domains, and malware hashes to evade IoC-based detection. This is why the cybersecurity community has progressively moved from purely IoC-based detection to TTP (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) based detection using frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK. TTP-based detection identifies attacker behaviour patterns rather than specific artefacts - behaviour patterns are much harder for attackers to change. For CRA manufacturers, this means:

  • IoC-based detection is a useful first layer but should not be the only detection mechanism.
  • SIEM detection rules should include TTP-based behavioural detections alongside IoC signature matches.
  • When a vulnerability in the product's technology stack is published, manufacturers should identify the likely exploitation TTPs and develop detection rules that would fire if those techniques were used against their infrastructure or products.

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Frequently asked

Are there free sources of IoCs that CRA manufacturers can use?+

Yes. Several high-quality free IoC sources are available: MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform) community feeds; AlienVault OTX (Open Threat Exchange); Abuse.ch MalwareBazaar and URLhaus; GreyNoise community tier; Feodo Tracker; and national CSIRT public advisory feeds. These free sources provide a useful baseline. For manufacturers of higher-risk products, commercial threat intelligence feeds with faster updates, higher fidelity, and sector-specific coverage are worth the investment.

Can an IoC confirm that my specific product is being exploited?+

IoCs indicate that a known exploitation tool or attacker infrastructure was observed - they don't always conclusively confirm that your specific product was the target or was successfully compromised. An IoC match might mean: your infrastructure was targeted (but the attack was blocked); your product was exploited in a customer environment (reported to you by the customer or detected in honeypot telemetry); or the IoC is a false positive (the observed artefact has a benign explanation). IoCs require investigation and triage before triggering a CRA Article 14 notification - the 24-hour clock starts when exploitation is confirmed, not when an IoC alert fires.

Should manufacturers share IoCs when their product is exploited?+

Yes. Sharing IoCs from confirmed exploitation incidents benefits the broader security community and is encouraged by ENISA, national CSIRTs, and the NIS2 information sharing framework. Manufacturers should share IoCs (with appropriate redaction of sensitive customer information) with relevant national CSIRTs and, where appropriate, sector ISACs. CRA Article 14 final reports include exploitation details that ENISA may use to update the EUVDB and share with the community. Proactive IoC sharing beyond the regulatory minimum strengthens the manufacturer's relationship with the security community and national authorities.

Sector checklists covering Indicator of Compromise (IoC)

Enterprise Networking EquipmentEnterprise networking equipment - switches, firewalls, load balancers, and network management systems - spans multiple Annex III classifications. Firewalls in hardware or software form and intrusion detection and prevention systems are Important Class II. Switches, routers, wireless access points, network management systems and SIEM systems are Important Class I. A load balancer is default class unless its core functionality is a listed category, such as a web application firewall. Class II products always need third-party conformity assessment (Article 32(3)). Class I products need a notified body today, because no CRA harmonised standard is cited yet (Article 32(2)).Industrial Controllers & PLCsIndustrial controllers, PLCs, and SCADA components are default-class products under the CRA, because classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)) and Annex III lists no industrial control category. They can use Module A internal control (Article 32(1)). These products have long operational lifetimes (10–20+ years), network connectivity, and significant safety implications. These facts raise the risk that the Article 13(2) risk assessment must address. Article 14 reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the conformity obligations apply from 11 December 2027.Smart Home DevicesSmart home devices, such as thermostats, smart speakers, lighting controllers and home security cameras, are among the most common products with digital elements in scope for the CRA. Thermostats and lighting controllers are default class, and Module A internal control is open to them (Article 32(1)). A smart speaker with a general purpose virtual assistant is Important Class I (Annex III, point 16). A home security camera, smart lock, baby monitor or alarm system is Important Class I (Annex III, point 17). So is a hub or software that centrally controls these security products.

This definition is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.

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