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EmergingDeadline: 11 December 2027

CRA Compliance Checklist: Satellite & Space Technology

Default class for most ground segment systems and GNSS receivers. Important Class I for a user terminal or gateway whose core functionality is a satellite modem for connection to the internet or a router (Annex III, point 12), and for network management systems (Annex III, point 6)

Satellite and space technology presents unique CRA challenges. Classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)), and Annex III lists no satellite or ground segment category. Most ground segment systems and satellite navigation receivers are default class. A user terminal whose core functionality is a router or a modem for connection to the internet, such as a VSAT or satellite broadband modem, is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12). Software whose core functionality is network management is Important Class I (Annex III, point 6). The 2022 Viasat/KA-SAT cyberattack demonstrated the severe real-world impact of satellite cybersecurity failures.

14
checklist items
14
high priority
11 December 2027
deadline
Emerging
sector
CRA Classification:Default class for most ground segment systems and GNSS receivers. Important Class I for a user terminal or gateway whose core functionality is a satellite modem for connection to the internet or a router (Annex III, point 12), and for network management systems (Annex III, point 6)

Last updated 26 October 2026

1. Scope & Classification

Classify each satellite product by its core functionality (Article 7(1))

highArticle 7(1), Annex III, points 6 and 12

Annex III lists no satellite or ground segment category. A user terminal or gateway whose core functionality is a router or a modem for connection to the internet is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12). The technical description of that point in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392 includes satellite modems. Software whose core functionality is network management is Important Class I (Annex III, point 6). Other ground segment systems and GNSS receivers are default class. Use in energy or other critical infrastructure does not change the class. It raises the risk that the Article 13(2) risk assessment must address.

Engage a notified body with satellite and telecommunications security expertise for Class I terminals, gateways and network management systems

highArticle 32, Annex VIII

A Class I product can use Module A only when the manufacturer fully applies a harmonised standard, a common specification or a European cybersecurity certification scheme at assurance level at least substantial (Article 32(2)). No CRA harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal yet, so today a Class I product needs a notified body. Default-class products can use Module A internal control (Article 32(1)). Satellite system assessments require specialised expertise in satellite communications security.

Assess CRA intersection with ETSI EN 303 645 and ETSI TR 103 743 satellite cybersecurity guidance

highArticle 13(2), CRA / ETSI EN 303 645

ETSI has published cybersecurity guidance for satellite systems. Aligning with relevant ETSI standards provides a recognised technical framework for CRA compliance.

Compile SBOM for all ground segment software, user terminal firmware, satellite modem software, and network management systems

high

Satellite systems include complex software stacks across space and ground segments. For the ground segment and user terminals (in-scope products), compile comprehensive SBOMs.

2. Product Security (Annex I Part I)

Implement encrypted and authenticated uplink and command communications for satellite operations systems

high and

Satellite command and control links must be encrypted and authenticated. Unauthenticated satellite control links create severe vulnerability to jamming, spoofing, and hijacking.

Implement strong authentication for all satellite network management systems and ground station interfaces

highAnnex I, Part I(2)

Ground station management systems with privileged access to satellite operations must implement MFA and strict access controls. The Viasat attack exploited management interface vulnerabilities.

Implement cryptographically signed firmware updates for user terminals - support secure OTA updates via satellite link

high

Satellite terminal firmware updates are often delivered via the satellite link itself. These must be cryptographically signed and verified before installation.

Implement anti-jamming and anti-spoofing capabilities appropriate to the satellite service type and user terminal classification

high and

Satellite jammers and GNSS spoofers are active threat actors. Implement GNSS anti-spoofing for navigation terminals and frequency-hopping or signal diversity for communication terminals where technically feasible.

3. CVD Policy & Vulnerability Handling

Publish a CVD policy coordinated with space sector information sharing organisations and national space agencies

highArticle 13(1)

Satellite system vulnerabilities can affect communications across entire continents. Coordinate CVD with space sector ISACs, ESA's ESAC cybersecurity team, and national security authorities.

Define security support lifecycle appropriate to satellite system operational timelines - ground segment 10+ years, user terminals 7+ years

high

Satellite systems have long operational lifespans. Ground segment infrastructure requires 10+ year security support. User terminals for critical applications warrant at least 7 years.

4. Article 14 Incident Reporting

Define Article 14 triggers for satellite incidents - focus on ground segment compromise, mass user terminal wiping (cf. Viasat attack), and satellite service disruption

highArticle 14(1)

The Viasat/KA-SAT attack in February 2022 bricked tens of thousands of user terminals across Europe. This is the paradigmatic satellite Article 14 trigger scenario.

Coordinate Article 14 ENISA reporting with national space authority notifications and, for affected critical infrastructure, parallel NIS2 reporting by operator customers

highArticle 14(2)

Satellite incidents affecting critical infrastructure customers simultaneously trigger CRA Article 14, NIS2 reporting by customers, and potentially national security authority notifications. Pre-plan all tracks.

5. CE Marking & Conformity Assessment

Complete EU-type examination with a notified body for Class I terminals, gateways and network management systems, and use relevant ETSI security standards as evidence

highArticle 32(2), Annex VIII

ETSI EN 303 645 and other ETSI standards are not cited CRA harmonised standards and give no presumption of conformity. Use them as a technical framework and map them to Annex I. Early engagement with the notified body is essential given the novelty of CRA assessment for space systems.

Issue EU Declaration of Conformity referencing the CRA for all in-scope satellite products - coordinate with Radio Equipment Directive compliance for terminal equipment

highArticle 20, Article 28

Satellite user terminals using radio spectrum must also comply with the Radio Equipment Directive. Coordinate both compliance tracks and reference both in the DoC.

Track your Satellite & Space Technology compliance progress in CVD Portal.

Classify each product, build the Annex VII technical file and prepare Article 14 notifications. The disclosure portal that receives vulnerability reports stays free.

Frequently asked

The satellite itself is in orbit - does CRA apply to the space segment?+

The CRA focuses on products placed on the EU market. Satellites themselves are not placed on the EU market in the conventional sense. However, the ground segment equipment, user terminals, and satellite management systems that are placed on the market are in scope. The security of the ground-to-space link and command and control systems - which are commercial products - falls within CRA scope.

We manufacture GNSS navigation receivers for use in vehicles and aviation - are they in CRA scope?+

It depends on the legal act that applies. A receiver certified under Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 is outside the CRA (Article 2(3)). A receiver designed and constructed exclusively for vehicles under Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 is outside the CRA (Article 2(2)). Equipment that falls within the scope of Directive 2014/90/EU is also outside the CRA (Article 2(4)). Other GNSS receivers, such as standalone consumer units, are in scope. Annex III lists no GNSS or navigation category, so they are default class. Safety-critical use does not change the class. Anti-spoofing capabilities are increasingly important for CRA compliance given active GNSS spoofing threats in parts of Europe.

Our satellite broadband service is used by wind farms and utilities - does CRA apply to our user terminals?+

Yes. User terminals (satellite modems, VSAT units) are products with digital elements in CRA scope. A terminal whose core functionality is a modem for connection to the internet or a router is Important Class I (Annex III, point 12), whoever the customer is. Use in energy or utility networks does not change the class. It raises the risk that the Article 13(2) risk assessment must address. The service itself (cloud-based management) is outside CRA scope, but the terminal hardware and firmware are fully in scope.

This checklist is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.

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