CRA Compliance Checklist: Industrial Robotics & Collaborative Robots
Default class for most industrial robots and cobots, because Annex III lists no robot or machinery category
Industrial robots and collaborative robots (cobots) are safety-critical connected systems deployed in manufacturing, logistics, and process automation. Most are default-class products, because classification follows core functionality (Article 7(1)) and Annex III lists no robot or machinery category. Deployment in critical infrastructure does not change the class. Safety and security are inseparable in robotics. A cyber attack that disables safety interlocks can cause physical harm.
Last updated 13 November 2026
1. Scope & Classification
Confirm the class of each robot product line from its core functionality (Article 7(1))
Annex III lists no robot or cobot category, so most robots are default class. Network connectivity and software-defined safety functions do not change the class. They raise the risk that the Article 13(2) risk assessment must address.
Address SCADA integration and critical infrastructure use in the Article 13(2) risk assessment
Use in energy, water or automotive assembly raises the risk to address. It does not make a robot Class II. An integrated Annex III component, such as an operating system or a network switch, does not raise the class of the robot (Article 7(1)).
Assess the intersection with the EU Machinery Regulation (2023/1230) - CRA cybersecurity and Machinery Regulation safety requirements must both be satisfied
The Machinery Regulation applies from 20 January 2027. Its Annex III, sections 1.1.9 and 1.2.1 require protection against corruption and control systems that withstand reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts. CRA compliance does not give a presumption of conformity with those sections (CRA recital 53). Run one risk assessment that covers both acts, and follow the conformity assessment of each act.
Decide who is the manufacturer when an integrator builds or modifies a robot cell
Under the CRA, an importer or distributor that substantially modifies a robot already on the market becomes its manufacturer (Article 21). Any other person becomes the manufacturer only when it substantially modifies the robot and makes it available on the market (Article 22(1)). Under the Machinery Regulation, the person who carries out a substantial modification becomes the manufacturer also when it keeps the machine (Machinery Regulation Article 18). Record the role of each party in the contract.
Compile a full SBOM covering robot controller OS, motion planning software, safety modules, and all network-facing components
Robot controllers run complex software stacks including real-time OS, motion control frameworks, and OPC-UA or ROS2 middleware. All must be tracked.
2. Product Security (Annex I Part I)
Implement role-based access control with strong authentication for all robot programming and administration interfaces
Unauthorised access to robot programming interfaces can cause physical harm. Enforce MFA and role separation between operators, programmers, and administrators.
Encrypt all communications between robots, controllers, and supervisory systems
Robot-to-controller and robot-to-SCADA communications must be encrypted. Industrial protocols (OPC-UA, MQTT) should be deployed over TLS.
Implement network segmentation to isolate robot control networks from corporate IT and the internet
Robot control networks should be on isolated VLANs or air-gapped segments. Internet connectivity for remote monitoring must be mediated by a secure gateway.
Ensure safety function integrity is preserved under cyber attack - safety interlocks must not be software-defeatable
Hardware-enforced safety limits (torque limits, speed limits, workspace limits) must be independent of the software control stack and not overridable via network commands.
Implement tamper-evident audit logging of all robot configuration changes, program uploads, and safety parameter modifications
Forensic logging is essential for incident investigation. Logs must be tamper-evident and stored off the robot controller. lets the user opt out of security logging. For a robot that is machinery, the opt-out must not stop the logs of the Machinery Regulation. Its Annex III, section 1.2.1(f) requires a tracing log of interventions and of the safety software versions uploaded after placing on the market, kept for five years after each upload. Keep the two logs apart, or limit the opt-out to the CRA part.
3. CVD Policy & Vulnerability Handling
Publish a CVD policy and security contact for robot controller software and associated management platforms
Industrial robotics platforms have attracted increasing security research attention. A clear CVD policy is required and demonstrates responsible security stewardship.
Define security patch delivery process for robot controllers in production environments with minimal downtime
Industrial operators cannot take robots offline arbitrarily. Develop an update process supporting scheduled maintenance windows with validated patch testing.
Establish a coordinated disclosure process with industrial customers for site-specific vulnerability remediation
Enterprise and industrial customers need advance notice of security patches to plan maintenance windows. Build customer notification into your CVD process.
4. Article 14 Incident Reporting
Define what constitutes an actively exploited vulnerability in a robot system - focus on safety, production disruption, and data exfiltration
For robotics, a remotely exploitable vulnerability that could affect safety interlocks or cause uncontrolled motion is the highest-severity trigger for Article 14.
Document the Article 14 notification chain including OT security team, legal, and ENISA reporting platform contact
Industrial incidents often involve both IT and OT teams plus safety officers. The Article 14 process must involve all relevant stakeholders.
5. CE Marking & Technical Documentation
For default-class robots, carry out Module A internal control and document conformity with Annex I
Module A is open to default-class products. A Class I product can use Module A only when the manufacturer fully applies a harmonised standard, a common specification or a European cybersecurity certification scheme (Article 32(2)). The Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 has its own conformity assessment procedure.
Prepare integrated technical file covering both Machinery Regulation and CRA requirements to avoid duplication
Robot technical files typically already exist for Machinery Regulation compliance. Extend them with CRA cybersecurity risk assessment, SBOM, and CVD policy sections.
Issue EU Declaration of Conformity referencing both the CRA and Machinery Regulation
A single DoC can reference multiple directives/regulations. Ensure the CRA is explicitly listed alongside the Machinery Regulation and any other applicable legislation.
For a robot arm supplied as partly completed machinery, issue a CRA EU declaration of conformity and affix the CE marking for the arm
Many robot arms are supplied as partly completed machinery. Under the Machinery Regulation, the arm gets a declaration of incorporation and assembly instructions, and the CE marking follows only for the completed machine. Under the CRA, the arm is a product with digital elements in its own right. From 11 December 2027 it needs its own EU declaration of conformity and CE marking (Article 28, Article 30). That marking does not cover the machinery safety of the finished robot cell.
Track your Industrial Robotics & Collaborative Robots compliance progress in CVD Portal.
Classify each product, build the Annex VII technical file and prepare Article 14 notifications. The disclosure portal that receives vulnerability reports stays free.
Frequently asked
Is a collaborative robot (cobot) treated differently from a traditional industrial robot under the CRA?+
The CRA does not distinguish between cobots and traditional robots - both are products with digital elements subject to the same requirements. However, cobots operate in close proximity to humans, which makes the safety-security intersection particularly critical. A security compromise affecting cobot safety functions has direct physical harm potential and should be treated as the highest severity.
Our robots run ROS2 - does the open-source middleware affect our CRA obligations?+
Using open-source middleware like ROS2 does not reduce your CRA obligations as the product manufacturer. You are responsible for the security of the entire product, including all open-source components. You must include ROS2 and all its dependencies in your SBOM and monitor them for CVEs. The open-source community maintains ROS2 security advisories that you should subscribe to.
We supply robots to automotive manufacturers who integrate them into their production lines - who is responsible for CRA compliance?+
As the robot manufacturer, you are responsible for the robot as a product with digital elements, including vulnerability handling and Article 14 reporting for the whole support period. The automotive manufacturer that integrates the robot into its line is normally a user under the CRA. If it is not your importer or distributor, it becomes a manufacturer under the CRA only after a substantial modification and a making available on the market (Article 22(1)). The Machinery Regulation is different. An integrator that builds a robot cell is normally the manufacturer of that assembly. A person who substantially modifies machinery becomes its manufacturer also when it keeps the machine (Machinery Regulation Article 18). Put the support period, the installation of updates and the reporting of vulnerabilities in the sales contract.
Policy templates for Industrial Robotics & Collaborative Robots
Free CRA tools
This checklist is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.
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