CRA Compliance Checklist: EV Charging Equipment & EVSE
Default class for residential, public and grid-integrated EV chargers, because Annex III lists no EV charging or energy management category. An integrated physical payment terminal with a tamper-protected security box is a critical product in its own right (Annex IV, point 1), and the charger stays default class
Compliance tips for EV chargers and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) manufacturers under the EU Cyber Resilience Act. EV charging stations, Level 2 chargers, and DC fast chargers sit at the intersection of energy infrastructure, payment systems, and connected electric vehicles (EV). Residential and public chargers are default class, because Annex III lists no EV charging category (Article 7(1)). Grid integration and public use do not change the class. They raise the risk that the Article 13(2) cybersecurity risk assessment must address. Secure communication protocols (OCPP 2.0.1, ISO 15118) and vulnerability management are required compliance elements.
Last updated 26 October 2026
1. Classification & Scope
Classify EV chargers as default class by their core functionality (Article 7(1))
Annex III lists no EV charging category, so home, public and grid-integrated chargers are default class. Grid management or SCADA integration does not change the class. It raises the risk that the Article 13(2) risk assessment must address.
Classify integrated payment terminals and secure elements separately from the charger
Annex III lists no energy management category, so V2G and demand-response chargers stay default class. A physical payment terminal with a tamper-protected security box is critical (Annex IV, point 1). An embedded UICC or a TPM is critical (Annex IV, point 3). Integration of these components does not change the class of the charger.
Determine if public charging network software qualifies as critical infrastructure under NIS2
Large-scale public charging network operators may be Essential or Important Entities under NIS2. NIS2 and CRA obligations must be coordinated.
Compile SBOM covering charger firmware, OCPP client, payment module, and cloud backend
EV charger stacks include OCPP client libraries, payment processing modules, cellular modem firmware, and power electronics firmware. All must be tracked.
2. OCPP & Communication Security
Implement OCPP 2.0.1 with TLS 1.2+ for all charge point to CSMS communication
OCPP 1.6 WebSocket without TLS is insecure and should not be used in new products. OCPP 2.0.1 with mutual TLS provides encrypted, authenticated communication.
Implement certificate-based authentication between charge point and CSMS
Each charge point must have a unique device certificate. Shared group credentials are not acceptable.
Implement OCPP security events - log and report authentication failures, firmware tampering, and configuration changes
OCPP 2.0.1 defines security event notifications. Implement and forward these to the CSMS for monitoring.
Restrict CSMS connectivity to authorised backend only - prevent rogue CSMS connections
Chargers that accept connections from any WebSocket endpoint are vulnerable to hijacking. Pin to known CSMS certificates.
3. Payment & User Authentication Security
Implement PCI DSS compliance for any charger that processes payment card data directly
CRA and PCI DSS requirements overlap significantly for payment-capable chargers. Achieving PCI DSS compliance contributes to CRA Annex I conformity.
Implement tamper detection for payment terminal hardware (if integrated)
Physical tamper detection prevents card skimmer installation. Hardware tamper detection with alert is required for payment-capable chargers.
Encrypt RFID card data and prevent card cloning via replay attack protections
Many chargers use RFID for user authentication. RFID communication must be encrypted and replay-resistant.
4. Firmware & Update Security
Implement signed firmware updates - reject unsigned or tampered updates before installation
Charger firmware controls power delivery. Unsigned firmware would allow an attacker to modify charging behaviour or disable safety protections.
Support OCPP 2.0.1 signed firmware update mechanism (FirmwareStatusNotification)
OCPP 2.0.1 defines a signed firmware update flow. Implement this rather than a proprietary update mechanism.
Implement secure boot to verify firmware integrity at startup
Secure boot prevents modified firmware from running even after physical access to the charger.
5. CVD & Incident Reporting
Publish a CVD policy covering charge point hardware, firmware, and CSMS software
EV charging security research is growing rapidly. A CVD policy creates a structured channel for responsible disclosure.
Establish Article 14 monitoring for exploitation of EV charger vulnerabilities in the wild
EV charger vulnerabilities affecting public charging networks may constitute critical infrastructure incidents. Monitor threat intelligence specifically for your OCPP implementation.
Pre-establish Article 14 notification relationships with national CSIRTs and energy sector CERTs
EV charger incidents affecting public infrastructure should be reported to both general CSIRTs and sector-specific energy CERTs.
Track your EV Charging Equipment & EVSE compliance progress in CVD Portal.
Classify each product, build the Annex VII technical file and prepare Article 14 notifications. The disclosure portal that receives vulnerability reports stays free.
Frequently asked
We make home chargers with no smart grid features - do we still need to comply with the CRA?+
Yes. Any EV charger with network connectivity (Wi-Fi, cellular, Ethernet) is a product with digital elements in scope for the CRA. Even a basic home charger with smartphone app connectivity must comply with Annex I security requirements, maintain an SBOM, and have a CVD policy. The conformity assessment is self-assessment (Default class).
Our chargers use OCPP 1.6 - do we need to upgrade to OCPP 2.0.1 for CRA compliance?+
OCPP 1.6 without TLS does not meet CRA Annex I requirements for encrypted communication. You can maintain OCPP 1.6 if you implement it over WebSocket Secure (WSS/TLS), but OCPP 1.6 lacks the security profile features of OCPP 2.0.1. The most straightforward path to CRA compliance for new products is OCPP 2.0.1 with security profile 3 (TLS + mutual certificate authentication).
Does EN 17483-1 give a presumption of conformity with the CRA for EV chargers?+
No. The Official Journal cites no harmonised standard under the CRA yet, so no standard gives a presumption of conformity with Annex I today (Article 27(1)). EN 17483-1 is not a CRA harmonised standard. Check the scope of any standard before you use it as evidence. OCPP 2.0.1 security profiles and ISO 15118 can support your Article 13(2) risk assessment and your technical file.
Policy templates for EV Charging Equipment & EVSE
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This checklist is part of the EU Cyber Resilience Act guide, which explains Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 article by article.
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